

WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE TRINIDAD AND  
TOBAGO DEFENCE FORCE IN COMBATING  
THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO DEFENCE FORCE IN COMBATING THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE? by Lt. Col. Ancil W. Antoine, Trinidad and Tobago, 96 pages.

This study examines the role of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force in combating the illegal drug trade in view of the harmful effects narco trafficking is having on the nation. It compares and contrasts the different counterdrug models used by the United States and Trinidad and Tobago. It analyses the functions of the government organizations in support of national interests and the counterdrug effort at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The evidence shows that role of the military in the Trinidad and Tobago model is minimal, piecemeal, and ineffective and can be compared to the pre-1989 United States model. The United States model is synchronized and coordinated and provides a comprehensive effort to counterdrug operations. Trinidad and Tobago should adopt a modified version of the United States model with an enhanced role for the Defence Force in the new model. The Defence Force can provide the means whereby there is synchronization and coordination throughout the counterdrug effort at all levels of MOOTW and in support of national interests and objectives. This would provide Trinidad and Tobago with a new comprehensive, coordinated, and synchronized model for counterdrug operations that is national in scope.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	ii
ABSTRACT .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .....	ix
LIST OF TABLES .....	x
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW .....	16
3. RESEARCH DESIGN .....	24
4. ANALYSIS .....	37
5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS .....	67
TABLES .....	80
ILLUSTRATIONS .....	91
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	93
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	96

## ABBREVIATIONS

AG	Attorney General
AID	Agency for International Development
ASD	Assistant Secretaries for Defense
BNHQ	Battalion Headquarters
CD	Counterdrug
CDS	Chief of Defense Staff
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
COP	Commissioner of Police
COTTR	Commanding Officer of Trinidad and Tobago Regiment
CINC	Commander in Chief
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
DoD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HN	Host Nation
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INL	Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization



JCET	Joint Combined Exercise for Training
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOCC	Joint Operation Control Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
MNS	Ministry of National Security
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOOTW	Military Operation Other Than War
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
ONCDP	Office of the National Drug Control Policy
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RHQ	Regimental Headquarters
SCC	Standing Committee on Crime
SecDef	Secretary of Defence
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SIA	Special Intelligence Agency
SSA	Special Services Agency
TREAS	Department of Treasury
TTDF	Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force
TTCG	Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard

TTR	Trinidad and Tobago Regiment
USIA	United States Information Agency

## ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. National Security and Defence Councils .....	26
2. Map of Trinidad and Tobago.....	91
3. Map of the Caribbean Sea.....	92

## TABLES

Table	Page
1. Trinidad and Tobago Counterdrug Model.....	80
2. United States Counterdrug Model.....	86

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The topic of this thesis provides an examination of the active participation of the armed forces of Trinidad and Tobago in combating the international drug trade in the domain of Trinidad and Tobago. The terms illegal drug trade, international drug trade, and Caribbean drug trade are sometimes used interchangeably but the term illegal drug trade will be used in the thesis. The illegal drug trade is further confined to the drug trade in the domain of Trinidad and Tobago and all movement and activities of drug traffickers and illegal drugs within its sovereign territory and area of national influence. The illegal drug trade influences a wide range of governmental functions. These include legal, administrative, economic, law enforcement, financial, military functions, and their social and political consequences.

Trinidad and Tobago must effectively combat the illegal drug trade by increasing its use of national power in the region. This is possible by recognizing the instruments of power available to the nation-state, developing them, and using their resources.<sup>1</sup> The research question therefore is what should be the role of the armed forces in fighting the illegal drug trade in Trinidad and Tobago? The study seeks the answers to the questions: What should be Trinidad and Tobago's National Security Strategy? What should be the National Military Strategy? What should be the counterdrug strategy for the nation of Trinidad and Tobago? What will be the military's role in supporting a national counterdrug strategy? How will a national counterdrug strategy for Trinidad and Tobago support the counterdrug strategy of its major ally the United States? How can an economically advanced small nation-state like Trinidad and Tobago influence its less

fortunate neighbors to develop a regional counterdrug strategy? Is there in Trinidad and Tobago the national will to mobilize its citizenry to combat the illegal drug trade? How does the counterdrug strategy of the United States affect Trinidad and Tobago's own counterdrug strategy and vice versa? Does Trinidad and Tobago possess the desire to spearhead the regional effort required for a war on drugs? The study promotes the perspective that a holistic approach to the problem is necessary.

Trinidad and Tobago is a twin island nation-state located close to the South American continent at the end of the chain of Caribbean islands at 10-11 degrees north latitude and 60-61 degrees longitude. The area of both islands is 1,978 square miles. The climate is tropical and both islands have generous areas of green lush vegetation, dense rain forests, mountains, swamps, and sunny beaches. The islands are different in many ways as Trinidad's fauna and flora is South American while Tobago is Caribbean. Trinidad has extensive deposits of oil and natural gas and vast plains that are perfect for agriculture. Tobago is an ideal tourist destination with rain forests, white sandy beaches, and a coral reef with a large variety of tropical fish. Trinidad has a natural sheltered harbor in the Gulf of Paria that separates the island from Venezuela and creates a sea-lane for international traffic.

Christopher Columbus landed on the islands of Trinidad and Tobago on his third voyage in 1492. Trinidad remained a backwater Spanish possession until the 1770 when French settlers and their slaves fleeing revolution in France and its colonies migrated to Trinidad under special conditions to develop the colony. The Dutch, French and British fought over Tobago for several centuries until it was finally ceded to the British in 1802. The British responded to the French influence in Trinidad by capturing it in 1797 and it

was joined to Tobago as a single colony in 1898. The colony of Trinidad and Tobago remained a British colony until its independence in 1962. Since independence Trinidad and Tobago experienced several major political and social upheavals. The Civil Rights Movement in the United States inspired university students at the St. Augustine Campus in Trinidad to organize a Black Power Movement that ultimately challenged civil authority resulting in the declaration of a state of emergency in 1970. Several junior army officers supported the Black Power Movement, however, resulting in an army mutiny on the 21 April 1970. The mutiny was crushed by loyalist troops and the soldiers were court-martialed. The early 1970s and early 1980s saw the emergence of a guerrilla movement of disenchanted young men and women, National Union of Freedom fighters (NUFF) who challenged the civil authorities in an armed struggle until crushed by the army and police. In 1990 a Muslim fundamentalist group attempted a coup d'état but was also defeated and the leaders captured by the military.

Trinidad and Tobago has a population of more than 1.3 million with the main concentration in Trinidad's northern region. Its people consist of the descendants of Native Americans, Europeans, Africans, East Indians, Chinese, and Middle Eastern ethnic groups. Its population has a history of peaceful coexistence and adaptation of the various subcultures into a diverse culture and the introduction of an indigenous cultural mix, which is unique. Trinidad and Tobago boasts a plural, cosmopolitan society of different races, cultures, and religions that coexist peacefully.

Trinidad and Tobago has the most diverse and developed economy of the English speaking Caribbean chain of islands. It has vast reserves of oil and natural gas and in the years since independence it was able to diversify its economy from a dependence on oil

and petroleum products. Trinidad and Tobago is the financial capital of the southern Caribbean providing investments, banking, conference facilities, and international travel connections, and is becoming a gateway to Latin America. Trinidad produces petroleum products, methanol and urea, iron and steel, fertilizers, plant machinery, agricultural products, rum, fishing, small crafts and pleasure boats, and is a tourist destination for its annual street festival carnival. Tobago produces agricultural products, handicraft, fishing and encourages visitors with its sandy beaches and relaxed lifestyle. Trinidad and Tobago's population is literate and its education system provides academic, vocational, and technical training up to tertiary level to support its industrial base. (See figure 1.)

Trinidad and Tobago has a stable democracy and is a staunch ally of the United States. It has three major political parties and a different party won the general election in 1986, 1991 and 1995. The transition of the reigns of power and apparatus of government was smooth for every change of government since gaining independence from Great Britain. Trinidad and Tobago is a parliamentary democracy with a written constitution and a political system based on the separation of powers. The government consists of an executive, a two-chambered legislature, and an independent judiciary. The government has provided the required leadership to focus its people on the objectives that are necessary to achieve its national interests. The country's ongoing efforts to combat the menace of the Caribbean drug trade adequately demonstrate this. Trinidad and Tobago, like the United States of America, recognizes that the international drug trade is a threat to its national interests. Trinidad and Tobago's government is committed to using all instruments of national power at its disposal, i.e. diplomacy, information, military, and economic instruments to succeed in its war on drugs.



The National Security Council is responsible for the development and implementation of a policy on national security. The council comprises senior members of government, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the special adviser to the Prime Minister. A Defence Council comprising the Minister of National Security, Attorney General, a minister appointed by the Prime Minister, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of National Security is charged with the command, administration, and discipline of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. The Defence Council grants the Chief of Defence Staff operational control while maintaining administrative control of the Defence Force.

The Defence Act, Chapter 1401 of the Laws of Trinidad and Tobago established the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force in 1962. It comprises a unit of Land Forces called the Regiment and a naval unit called the Coast Guard with an air component. Expatriate British officers, personnel from the disbanded West Indian Regiment and locally recruited officers and men, formed the units of the Defence Force. Several reorganizations of the Defence Force resulted in the Regiment being organized as a mixed brigade with infantry, engineer, logistics battalions, and a reserve infantry battalion. The Coast Guard now has a naval squadron, small boats squadron, logistics units and an air wing. The role of the Defence Force has evolved over the years to include the following:

1. Aid to the civil power in maintaining law and order
2. Humanitarian assistance in times on natural and man made disasters
3. Ceremonial duties

4. Search and Rescue operations in accordance with national, regional, and international commitments

5. Counterdrug operations in support on the national law enforcement agencies

6. National environmental monitoring and protection

7. Protection of economic exclusion zone

8. Safety of shipping in territorial waters

9. Community development

10. Civilian Conversation Corps

11. Youth and sport development

There are a number of government agencies in Trinidad and Tobago apart from the Defence Force and the Police Service that are involved in counterdrug operations. The Special Service Agency (SSA), Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) and the Joint Operations Command Centre (JOCC) are recently formed agencies that play a direct role in counterdrug operations. The SSA is tasked with policy formulation, coordination, and centralization of information, technical assistance, and establishing external links in the preparation and monitoring of a drug interdiction strategy. The SIA is an agency tasked with gathering intelligence to be used in the detection and prevention of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals. It is manned by Defence Force, police, and national security personnel and provides the Defence Force and law enforcement agencies with intelligence on other national security interests as well. The JOCC is a command center that is manned by Defence Force personnel with representatives from the police, customs, and immigration who can coordinate the

activities of their respective departments in times of national emergencies or national security operations.

Colombia, Peru and Bolivia are the three largest producers of coca internationally. Coca is processed into cocaine and transported by land, sea, and air to destinations worldwide, but primarily to North America and Europe. In the late 1980's and early 1990's two major groups, the Medellin and Cali cartels, dominated drug trafficking. Counterdrug successes against these cartels resulted in a decentralization of operations with hundreds of smaller groupings involved in the drug trade at present. New methods of cocaine production have also introduced "black cocaine" to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies.

A new chemical process used by drug traffickers to evade detection by drug sniffing dogs and chemical tests creates "Black Cocaine". The traffickers add charcoal and other chemicals to cocaine, which transforms it into a black substance that has no smell and does not react when subjected to the usual chemical tests.<sup>2</sup>

Increased security at international airports and seaports in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Coast of Central America and the United States have caused a shifting of traditional drug routes and the establishment of new routes further to the south and into the Caribbean Sea. Drug traffickers are also improving their transport capabilities by manufacturing boats that are capable of carrying up to two tons of cocaine at high speeds.<sup>3</sup> This is particularly important in the Caribbean where nation states do not have the resources or equipment to compete with the technology that the drug traffickers are capable of acquiring on the international market.

The Caribbean Sea is fertile ground for drug traffickers with the proliferation of seashores, inlets, bays, small islands, and beaches to conduct illegal activities and the

transshipment of their illegal cargoes. Some of the new cocaine routes include using the river systems of South America like the Amazon and Orinoco to transport the drug to the coast. Small craft ferry the cocaine to the Caribbean islands for transshipment to larger ships or aircraft to destinations in North America and Europe.

The Caribbean Sea (figure 2) provides the narcotraffickers with access to international markets, a large geographical area, and a diversity of nation states in which they operate. Trinidad and Tobago is not a producer of cocaine but has gained prominence as a major transshipment point in the drug trade between the United States and its major supplier, Latin America. Trinidad and Tobago's close proximity to the Orinoco Delta of South America and its open coastline presents the narcotraffickers with convenient drop off and collection points. Trinidad and Tobago airports support the operations of thirteen commercial airlines providing access to destinations throughout the Caribbean, Latin America, the United States, and Europe with connecting flights to other international destinations. The three major cargo ports and ten additional ports handle special cargo facilitating brisk international trade and uncomplicated movement of commodities.

The growing pleasure craft industry and the development of marinas adds the dimension of small craft traffic throughout the territorial waters of the nation. It is estimated that approximately 2,000 kilograms of cocaine transit the country in a month.<sup>4</sup> The Central Intelligence Agency identifies the drug trade as a transnational issue for the nation as it recognizes that Trinidad and Tobago is a transshipment point for South American drugs destined for the US and Europe, and is also a producer of cannabis.<sup>5</sup>

The drug trade affects Trinidad and Tobago in a variety of ways. There is a damaging effect on the drug user, his family, friends, employer, and community.

Society experiences the pain of the drug problem through its impact on the work environment and the criminal justice system. It is estimated that 71% of all illegal drug users are employed either full or part time.<sup>6</sup>

The wealth that the illegal trade provides its participants is being used to finance other illegal activities throughout the society. Assassinations, gun battles between rival gangs, attacks on law enforcement agents, drive by shootings, are some of the phenomena of the increase in drug use and trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago. There are political, social, and economic effects throughout the society as a direct result of the use of Trinidad and Tobago's territory as a transshipment point for illegal drugs. Those who gain wealth from the trade attempt to influence the major societal players through bribes, threats, and violence. As society adjusts to deal with the situation, the drug trade threatens the very fabric of the society, transforming old problems anew and making successful solutions of yesterday no longer applicable today. New challenges arise, resulting in a tremendous drain on the assets of the state, in terms of the employment of its political, economic, social, and human resources.

#### Assumptions

Nation states must combat the drug menace using the instruments of national power at all levels of military operations other than war (MOOTW) (strategic, operational, and tactical) to achieve a permanent victory. This study stresses that at the strategic level there must be continuing cooperation between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago.

It is in the U.S. national economic interest to assure TT's continued macroeconomic growth and political stability and protect U.S. investments in the energy and petrochemical sectors while supporting sound environmental policies. A major transit point for narcotics from South America, it is also in the United States interest to strengthen the Trinidadian justice system and to continue to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies and the military to identify, capture and prosecute narcotraffickers.<sup>7</sup>

At the operational level there must be unity of effort through combining resources, joint planning, and execution of military operations emphasizing the role of the United States Armed Forces and the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. At the tactical level there must be the creation or upgrading and training of military units and law enforcement agencies to increase arrests, indictments, prosecutions, and convictions of narcotraffickers.

This study examines the view whether the armed forces of Trinidad and Tobago have a leading role to play in any national counterdrug strategy. Should military forces support Trinidad and Tobago's Counternarcotics Task Force by leading the fight against drugs and providing support to other domestic law enforcement agencies? The efforts of Trinidad and Tobago in developing and implementing a national drug master plan demonstrates its commitment to combating the illegal drug trade. Trinidad and Tobago can be an example to other Caribbean nations in formulating a counterdrug strategy synchronized with the counterdrug strategy of our northern neighbor the United States. This could result in a military plan to deal with the threat that the international drug trade poses to peace and stability in the region.

The study will examine if MOOTW is the best approach to deal with the international drug trade. Nation states like Trinidad and Tobago will have to mobilize

their resources at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to neutralize, contain, or destroy the threat that the international drug trade poses to regional and national stability.

#### Definitions

Caribbean Drug Trade: The trade in illegal drugs (cocaine, heroin, and cannabis) across borders and territorial waters within the Caribbean basin.

Caribbean Sea: Geographical area between the Atlantic Ocean and Central America including the chain of islands from Florida to Venezuela.

Chief of Defence Staff: Highest ranking officer in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.

Counterdrugs: Activities involving military and law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat the trafficking and sale of illegal drugs.

Counterdrug Operations: The range of military operations conducted with the purpose of monitoring, interdicting, and eliminating the international drug trade.

Defence Act: Chapter 1401 of the Laws of Trinidad and Tobago that governs the command, administration and discipline of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.

Defence Council: A Council charged with the command, administration, and discipline of the force.

Drug Trafficking: Production, transportation, and sale of illegal drugs

International Drug Trade: The trade in illegal drugs (cocaine, heroin, and cannabis) across borders and territorial waters.

Jammat al Muslimeen: A Muslim fundamentalist group that attempted to overthrow the Trinidad and Tobago Government

Joint Operations Command Center: A center that coordinates the emergency and crisis operations in Trinidad and Tobago.

Laundering: In counterdrug operations, the process of transforming drug money into a more manageable form while concealing its illicit origin. Foreign bank accounts and dummy corporations are used as shelters.

Law Enforcement Agencies: Any of a number of agencies (outside the DOD) chartered and empowered to enforce laws in the United States, a state, territory, or possession of the United States, or to enforce US laws within the borders of a host nation.

Levels of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW): Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels

Narcotraffickers: People involved in the illegal international drug trade.

National Power: The tool nation-states use to influence the behavior of other nation-states within the current international system.<sup>8</sup>

National Security Council: A council charged with the formulation and implementation of National Security Strategies in Trinidad and Tobago.

Operational level: The translation of the broad vision and strategic intent into operational objectives.

Sovereignty: The ability of a country to exercise preeminent control over the people and policies within its territorial boundaries.<sup>9</sup>

Strategic level: Broad policies and strategies set forth by national leaders in the form of objectives, concepts, and priorities.

Tactical level: The conducting of maneuvers by troops in the field within the intent of strategic guidance and operational plans.



### Limitations

The war on drugs is a current operation involving classified and sensitive records, documents, and information. This will impose limitations on the material that will be available for this research. Trinidad and Tobago does not have a national security strategy but is in the process of developing a national drug strategy master plan 1998- 2002. The national drug strategy masterplan mentions the role of the Coast Guard in the drug strategy but does not address the role of the Land Forces of the Defence Force in the counterdrug effort.

The National Drug Strategy offers the potential for using scarce resources effectively to address a broad spectrum of issues affecting both the supply and demand aspects of the drug problem. These include the cultivation of the plants, their export, traffic, sale and consumption; counter measures applied by the coast guard, the customs and the police; the legal justice apparatus, the banking system; the media, the education system; the social and health services, including the treatment and rehabilitation centers; and employee assistance programs.<sup>10</sup>

The development of a defence policy that will address counterdrug operations by the Defence Force is also being formulated. This will be a limitation in the use of guidelines in determining the military role in the counterdrug effort, as the defence policy will not at this point have the approval of the Defence Council. The illegal drug trade is a multidimensional, transnational, hemispheric wide phenomenon that engulfs all the Caribbean nation-states. The study focuses on Trinidad and Tobago's national interests and the effect that the Caribbean drug trade has on those interests. The study is limited to Trinidad and Tobago, its territorial boundaries, and its relations with the United States and hemispheric neighbors.

## Delimitations

This study examines the illegal drug trade and how it affects the nation-state of Trinidad and Tobago. It examines the strategic position of Trinidad and Tobago in relation to the United States and Latin America, and the use of its territorial waters for trafficking and its land space as a transshipment avenue. The study examines the role that the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force can play at the strategic and operational levels of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and not at the tactical level. The study therefore concentrates on the strategic and operational levels of the counterdrug effort. It touches slightly at the tactical level as this is necessary for a greater understanding of the strategic or operational levels but the research does not focus its efforts at the tactical level.

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<sup>1</sup> DJMO, CGSC. *Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting* (DJMO Selected Readings Book 1, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, August 1999), L 1 A 12.

<sup>2</sup> US General Accounting Office, *Drug Control: Narcotics Threat from Colombia Continues to Grow* (Washington, DC: USGPO 1999), 5.

<sup>3</sup> Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, *Common Sense for Drug Policy; Drug War Facts* **available** from <http://www.cspd.org/factbook/> 3, Internet, accessed 21 August, 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Strategic Services Agency, *The Illegal Narcotics Trade* (Port of Spain, Trinidad, Issue No.1/98, 20 February 1999), 2.

<sup>5</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book 1999, Trinidad and Tobago* Available from <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/td.html>, Internet, accessed 21 August, 1999.

<sup>6</sup> LTC John A Tappan, USAF, *Military involvement in the war on drugs "Just Say No"*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College,) 1998, Abstract.

<sup>7</sup> Department of State, The Secretary of State *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations FY 2000*, (Washington, DC: DOS, 1999), 927.

<sup>8</sup> DJMO, CGSC. *Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting* (DJMO Selected Readings Book 1, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, August 1999), L 1 A 10.

<sup>9</sup> DJMO, CGSC. *Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting* (DJMO Selected Readings: Go Book 1, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, August 1999), L 1 A 1.

<sup>10</sup> Government of Trinidad and Tobago, *National Drug Strategy Masterplan* (Port of Spain, TT: Government Printer, February 1998), 4.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The emphasis placed on counterdrug operations and the Caribbean drug trade by the international community resulted in a wealth of literature in the international, regional, and national arenas. A precursory survey of the available literature on the international drug trade indicates that there exist majority and minority views concerning the war against illegal drugs and the employment of military forces to combat it. These positions are not universal however, with writers for and against at international, regional, and national levels. Writers may support the minority view at the national level but support the majority views at the regional and international levels, or vice versa.

At the national level in the United States, the minority view advocates that the military involvement in the war against drugs proposes a military solution to a civilian problem and that there is no possible military endstate. The proponents of the minority view state that the involvement of the military in the war on drugs detracts from the military's primary function, which is warfighting. These authors question the success that the military has had in the fight against drugs and declare that the military is losing the war against drugs. Some authors call for the removal of the military from the war against the illegal drug trade.

The minority who oppose the use of the military in the war on drugs argue that the results so far indicate that the military is ineffective. They stated the following reasons and concerns against the use of the United States military in the war on drugs:

1. Drug interdiction will not work
2. United States readiness will be impaired

3. The military should not be involved in civilian law enforcement
4. The United States military would be exposed to corruption<sup>1</sup>

These writers see the continued use of military forces as a waste of resources and a distraction from its primary mission. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Tappan, USAF, is one of those writers and in his strategy research project “Military Involvement in the War on Drugs, Just say No” argues that the present policy violates the spirit of the Posse Comitatus against the involvement of the military in civilian affairs.

The War on Drugs has become such a threat that the United States government felt compelled to employ military forces to fight it. However, the involvement of military forces to combat a civil problem raises many clouded issues. First and foremost is the legal restraints placed upon the use of military troops involved in civil operations. This issue was specifically addressed in the 1800s to preclude any use of military force but was later revised in the 1980s to fit a unique situation. Coupled with this problem is the ineffective strategy of using military interdiction efforts, ways and means to reach an unmeasurable end. Past and present interdiction efforts failed, troops are not properly trained, resources are declining and above all, an end state in the War on Drugs is not defined. Therefore, the military should not be involved in the War on Drugs.<sup>2</sup>

The writers who ascribe to the majority view expand their perspective into the regional and international arenas and welcome the use of military forces in counterdrug operations. They advocate that the organization, expertise, and experience the military possesses are the best tools for combating the drug trade, nationally, regionally and internationally. The majority of the literature assesses the significance of the trade in illegal drugs to national, regional, and international interests. The illegal drug trade is a threat to a national, regional, and international security and a holistic approach to the problem including the use of military forces, is the best solution. The United States authorities take seriously the threat posed by those involved in the drug trade.

Those who contribute to the production, transport, sale, and use of illegal drugs and laundering of drug money present a threat to the national security of the United States.<sup>3</sup>

Major Matthew L. Smith, an adherent of the majority view, in his project for the School of Advanced Military Studies: “The war on drugs: Can an operational artist help win it?” declares that:

The military’s role in the drug war, while limited and sporadic in the past, is increasing, and if civilian agencies currently fighting the lion’s share of the war continue to lose ground, then the military can expect to see its involvement significantly expanded.<sup>4</sup>

The proponents of the majority view who champion the use of the military in combating the illegal drug trade call for greater cooperation and planning nationally, regionally, and internationally with a more dynamic military approach in order to achieve better results. They perceive the threat posed by the drug trade as a phenomena engulfing the entire global environment and not restricted to isolated pockets in distant far away lands. They understand that the activities of those involved in the drug trade will have far reaching effects beyond the boundaries of the nations in which the production, storage, shipment, and transshipment is taking place. The danger faced by government in Latin American and Caribbean countries place the citizens of the United States at risk as well.

The statistics provided by the literature is overwhelming in highlighting the seriousness of the threat that the drug trade poses to the global community.

The international drug business generates as much as \$400 billion in trade annually according to estimates in the World Drug report, which was commissioned by the United Nations International Drug Control Program. That amounts to 8% of all international trade and is comparable to the annual turnover in textiles, according to the study.<sup>5</sup>

Out of this \$400 billion, the drug traffickers earn gross profit margins of up to 300 percent. They use this money to undermine the legitimate governments in the countries in which they grow, produce, or manufacture the drugs. They also undermine the authorities as well as the nations that they use as shipping or transshipment ports as well. The plight of the producing countries is of concern to the international community as the security of entire regions is threatened by the power that this access to vast sums of money is creating.

In some Latin American countries, traffickers equipped with vast resources have corrupted individuals in every aspect of public life, compromising the integrity of entire national institutions - the political system and the judiciary, the military, the police, and banking and financial systems. The drug trade foment violence and lawlessness, threatening personal safety and national security.<sup>6</sup>

A great amount of literature is emerging in support of the majority view on the subject. Governmental and military reports, surveys, and studies on drug operations are major sources of literature that support the majority view. International, national, and military strategies and counterdrug strategies provide a wealth of literature on the subject as well. These documents seek to provide a solution to ending the menace of the illegal drug trade in Western societies.

At the regional level the Organization of American States is bringing the hemispheric nations together to develop a common approach to the drug problem.

The General Assembly, based on resolution AG/Res.699 (XIV-0/84), convened the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Traffic in Narcotic Drugs to review all aspects of the drug problem. The conference, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1986, concluded with the unanimous approval of the Inter-American Program of Action of Rio de Janeiro against the Illicit Use and Production on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Traffic Therein. That same year, the General Assembly established the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), through Resolution AG/RES.813 (XVI-0/86), and approved its Statute.<sup>7</sup>

A press release on 2 September 1999 announced that an antidrug evaluation tool was ready for final approval. The release stated the following:

The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism will measure national and regional progress in addressing all aspects of the drug problem, including production, trafficking and consumption. It will use several dozen indicators, or benchmarks, to assess a wide range of anti-drug efforts in four main areas; national drug plans and strategies; prevention and treatment; reduction in drug production; and improved law enforcement.<sup>8</sup>

At the national level, the government of Trinidad and Tobago produced a draft of the National Drug Strategy Master Plan, 1998-2002 in February 1998. This antidrug strategy states the priorities of the government with respect to the drug menace to the country and proposes solutions to the problems.

The National Drug Strategy offers the potential for using scarce resources effectively to address a broad spectrum of issues affecting both the supply and demand aspects of the drug problem . . . . In formulation anti-drug measures, the distinction as to whether the trafficking in drugs serves local Trinidadian market of drug consumption, or whether Trinidad is used as a transshipment hub for overseas markets in North America and Europe, is no longer relevant. Transit of narcotics “spills-over” into local consumption, and domestic demands “provokes” supply. Local middlemen, engaged in international transit activities, are remunerated with drugs, which they retail on the domestic market.<sup>9</sup>

The national drug masterplan formulates antidrug measures recognizing the fact that demand reduction and interdiction strategies are intertwined, and one cannot be effective without the other. The masterplan discusses the following issues as they relate to the national counterdrug effort:

1. The socioeconomic context in which the drug problems occur in the nation
2. The supply issues and the demand for drugs in the nation
3. The thrust of the National drug Master Plan and a summary of overall strategy

and common thread among the interventions to be followed



#### 4. The framework for action on both the supply and demand reduction sides

The different governmental agencies in Trinidad and Tobago are also beginning to provide literature on the Caribbean drug trade and counterdrug operations. The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force is presently developing a defence policy paper and the draft of that paper as it relates to the Caribbean drug trade is examined in this study. The Satellite is a series of papers produced by the Strategic Services Agency in which government officials examine existing and developing trends and techniques in the area of criminal justice and security as part of the agency's public information program.

At the national level in the United States, *National Security Strategy* (NSS), *National Military Strategy* (MNS), *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, *National Drug Control Strategy* (NDCS) are all sources of literature on the illegal drug trade and the strategies and efforts the United States is using to combat the menace. The NSS, MNS, and NDCS provide the overall strategic objectives, concepts, and priorities for the military and various government agencies to support the counterdrug effort of the United States. The Department of Defence (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Transport (DOT) also produce guidance and plans for their subordinate units involved in counterdrug operations. These documents provide the reader with information on the threat of illegal drugs to the interests of the United States and the activities of people involved in the illegal drug trade. It also provides information on the counterdrug organizations, relationships and interrelationships, command and control, various types of support available including host-nation support, and other valuable information on the fight against drugs.

Joint Pub 3-07.4 *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, published by the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a particularly valuable source of data on the illegal drug trade and the counterdrug efforts of the United States Armed Forces. The Office of National Drug Control Policy is responsible for developing, producing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of the national drug control strategy (NDCS). The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the United States Department of State provides the researcher with valuable data from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. These reports are sources of information that can assist in increasing the data on the illegal drug trade so that organizations can plan and implement counterdrug operations efforts more effectively. The status of potential worldwide production of illegal drugs, methodology for estimating illegal drug production, and worldwide illicit Drug Cultivation totals are some of the reports that researchers will find useful in gaining a greater understanding of the illegal drug trade and the organizations and individuals involved in it. The rest of the literature on the illegal drug trade includes statistics from surveys, research data, drug control reports, and lists of the cultivation and production of illegal drugs throughout the world.

The current literature supports majority and minority views on the illegal drug trade and counterdrug efforts. The publications, reports, and surveys that support the majority view are organized to assist counterdrug individuals and organizations in understanding the seriousness of the threat posed by the illegal drug trade at the national, regional, and international levels. They suggest proposals, formulas, and procedures for coordinating the efforts of national, regional, and international agencies in their fight against the illegal drug trade. The literature on the minority view questions the

effectiveness, for various reasons, of using the military in the fight against the drug trade, but in most areas are weighed in favor of national rather than regional or international concerns. They advise caution in increasing the involvement of the military in civilian affairs.

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<sup>1</sup> Peter H. Smith, *Drug Policy in the Americas* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 130.

<sup>2</sup> LTC John A Tappan, USAF, *Military involvement in the war on drugs "Just Say No"* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College,), 1998 Abstract.

<sup>3</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), xii.

<sup>4</sup> Major Matthew L. Smith, "The war on drugs: Can an operational artist help win it?" (SAMS, Monograph, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1989).

<sup>5</sup> Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, *Common Sense for Drug Policy; Drug War Facts, Associated Press, UN Estimates Drug Business Equal to 8 Percent of World Trade*, 26 June 1997. Available from <http://www.cspd.org/factbook/>, Internet, accessed 21 September 1999.

<sup>6</sup> E. Joyce, and C. Malamud, *Latin America and the Multinational Drug Trade* Institute of Latin American Studies Series. Available from <http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/031>, Internet accessed August 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Organization of American States, CICAD, Twenty-Sixth Regular Session, *Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) to the General Assembly of the Organization at its Thirtieth Regular Session*, (Montevideo, Uruguay: OAS, October 1999) 1.

<sup>8</sup> General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, Department of Public Information, Press Release, Anti-Drug Evaluation Tool Ready for Final Approval," (Washington, DC: OAS, September, 1999).

<sup>9</sup> Govt. of Trinidad and Tobago, *National Drug Strategy Master Plan* (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Government Printer, February 1998), 5.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH DESIGN

The design of this research is based on a comparison of the two models examined in this study. The models examined are those used by Trinidad and Tobago and the United States respectively in implementing their drug control strategies. Data on the international drug trade was available from research surveys, government records and reports, military studies, historical studies, and legal proceedings. Publications by the various organizations and agencies of the Trinidad and Tobago government were examined. These sources assisted in determining the role of our military in the nation's counterdrug effort. The various United States government publications such as the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, the *National Drug Control Strategy*, and the JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations* are sources that were examined. The research process included gathering the data from the relevant sources, arranging and studying the data in detail, and interpreting the output.

This chapter examines the models used by Trinidad and Tobago and the United States governments to combat the drug trade. The models will be analyzed and compared to determine their respective strengths and weakness with the purpose of optimizing the effectiveness of the Trinidad and Tobago counterdrug effort and enhancing the role of the Defence Force in that model.

The Trinidad and Tobago model for combating the illegal drug trade functions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the strategic level the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of National Security (MNS), and the Defence Council

function to formulate national strategy. At the operational level the Defence Force Headquarters, Police Service Headquarters, Attorney General's (AG) Office, Customs and Excise Department, Special Services Agency, Special Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Operations Command Center function to translate strategic guidance, concepts, and priorities into operational plans and objectives. At the tactical level the various subunits of the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment and Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard, the Police Service, and other government agencies implement tactical missions.

The Trinidad and Tobago model for counterdrug strategy and operations is given the highest priority through the establishment of the National Security Council that is headed by the country's Prime Minister. The other members of the council include the Minister of National Security, the Attorney General, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Commissioner of Police and the Special Adviser to the Prime Minister (a military officer in the rank of brigadier general/ commodore or colonel/captain).

The Prime Minister appoints his special adviser and who also serves as a member of the National Security Council. The principal role of the special adviser is to keep the Prime Minister informed about the current operational activities that are being conducted by the various government organizations and agencies. He is also required and expected to provide counsel and expert advice to the Prime Minister on matters involving national security. The special adviser also supervises the Joint Operations Center. This center operates as an emergency and crisis command center for agencies and organizations under the umbrella of the National Security Council. It concentrates and focuses the efforts of the various government security organizations and agencies into a single coordinated national effort in a time of emergency or crisis.

# Counterdrug Operations




Figure 1. National Security and Defence Councils

The National Security Council directs the Minister of National Security on strategic policy as it pertains to the counterdrug strategy and functions as chairman of the Defence Council. The ministers of National Security and Public Administration, the Attorney General, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of National Security make up the Defence Council. The constitution of Trinidad and Tobago charges the Defence Council with the operational and administrative control of the Defence Force. The council delegates the operational control of the force to the Chief of Defence Staff but retains administrative control of the force. The role of the Defence Council is to determine and formulate the strategic and operational strategy and policies of the Defence Force including its counterdrug strategy and policies.

The Attorney General's Office is involved in the operational aspects of the counterdrug effort. At the operational level the Attorney General's Office prepares, updates, monitors, and coordinates the legal effort in combating the drug trade. The Attorney General's Office ensures that activities carried out by forces engaged in counterdrug operations are permissible by local and international law and do not infringe on the constitutional rights of the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago. The Attorney General's Office also spearheads the activities of law enforcement agencies into the arena of information technology, money laundering, and the expansion of counterdrug operations into the banking and commercial systems.

At the operational level there are a number of headquarters that conduct operational planning and execution of the instruments of power as it affects counterdrug operations in Trinidad and Tobago. The Chief of Defence Staff operates from the Defence Force Headquarters (DFHQ) where he exercises operational control of the

Defence Force. DFHQ is task organized as a joint headquarters with some variations that are peculiar to Trinidad and Tobago but are structurally in accordance with the continental staff system. The Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (colonel/captain) administers the headquarters and four principal staff officers assist him: the land forces staff officer, maritime staff officer, the staff officer operations, and the staff officer administration. Branch staff officers from personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil military, and communications and information systems support these officers.

The Commissioner of Police administers the activities of the various branches of the Police Service from the Police Headquarters. A number of Deputy Commissioners of police with responsibilities for various functional activities in the Police Service such as crime, training, traffic, guard and emergency, and community police assists the commissioner. Assistant Commissioners of police manage the various regions of Trinidad and Tobago and are responsible to the Commissioner of Police for counterdrug activities within their boundaries. The police special branch is a subunit patterned after the British Intelligence Organizations and is responsible for the collection, analysis, and production of intelligence on crime and other illegal matters in Trinidad and Tobago.

The director of the Customs and Excise Unit of the Ministry of National Security is responsible to the minister for the operation of the Custom and Excise Department. His duties include the implementation of national strategies and policies as they relate to drug interdiction. The Customs and Excise Unit assigns staff to the Special Services Agency and Joint Operations Command Center to increase the effectiveness of coordinating the counterdrug effort.



In 1992 the Office for Strategic Services was created within the ministry of National Security to spearhead policy formulation and strategic development and this was replaced by the Strategic Services Agency in 1995 in keeping with an approach encouraged by the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> The Strategic Services Agency is accountable to Parliament through audited statements and annual report and is tasked with the development of strategic intelligence and make recommendations to the government on the formation of policies in relation to counternarcotics matters. It coordinates all matters relating to a dangerous drugs supply-reduction program and it prepares and monitors the implementation of a drug interdiction strategy. The agency functions as a centralized office for information to facilitate the detection and prevention of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals. It provides a central point for the receipt of all disclosure made under the drug legislation. It maintains a database on manufacturers and suppliers of precursor chemicals and other substances and articles used in illegal production of drugs in Trinidad and Tobago and internationally. It disseminates its information to the law enforcement agencies that carry out the actual seizures and arrests.<sup>2</sup> The agency also negotiates technical assistance for the dangerous drugs supply reduction program and contributes to training of the specialized staff. The establishment of lines of communications with domestic and overseas services, coordinating operations, and cooperation with external links are some of its responsibilities.<sup>3</sup>

The units of the Defence Force, the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment and Coast Guard, both exercise operational control over their various subunits. The different battalions' headquarters (BNHQs) of the Regiment carry out the operational planning and

tactical missions of the counterdrug operations. The operational branch of the Coast Guard and the air wing exercise operational control of the ships, aircraft, and personnel involved in counterdrug operations. The fleet, small boats, and aircraft conduct monitoring, search and rescue, and interdiction missions in the nation's territorial waters and air space.

The United States' model for counterdrug operations is a complex mosaic of federal counterdrug organizations. The model includes various departments, bureaus, services, agencies and administrations that function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of government. The United States model emphasizes coordination and integration at all levels to achieve success. It recognizes that the complex nature of the environment in the United States leads to complications in the implementation of policies and strategies. It identifies the factors that complicate the process as:

Large and diverse organizational missions and structures, differing regional boundaries for subordinate organizations, language differences (both national languages and use of acronyms between US agencies), and even interagency mistrust. There are also structural and philosophical differences between military and civilian law enforcement organizations.<sup>4</sup>

The input of the various counterdrug organizations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels will be examined as part of the United States model. At the strategic level, broad policy is established and desired conditions are agreed to. The Executive Office of the President, through the National Security Council and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, two subordinate organizations, sets forth the national counterdrug strategy. They determine the strategic objectives, strategic concepts and priorities for resources. The strategic objectives determine what needs to be done to support policy and protect national interests; the strategic concepts, detail how it will be done, and prioritizes

the national resources in terms of money, manpower and job accomplishment time. At the theater strategic level, the geographic combatant commanders (CINCs) design the theater strategy and campaign to accomplish the broad national direction<sup>5</sup>

The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum for national security issues that require Presidential decision. Its function is to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.<sup>6</sup>

The strategic effort continues with the participation of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DOS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) where there is some measure of overlap between the strategic and operational undertakings.

The NSC sponsors various interagency committees and regional committees that formulate recommend, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of national security policy and strategy.<sup>7</sup>

The office of national drug control policy is an agency that functions from the Executive Office of the President and has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of the national drug control policy (NDCP) both domestically and internationally. The director of the ONDCP, the “drug czar,” is a member of the President’s Cabinet and is the principal administration and national spokesperson on illicit drug use and related issues. The director’s role is to create a national understanding of the nature of threat from illicit drug use and the importance of resisting drugs at all levels of society. He also serves as “drug issue advocate” within the cabinet, developing collaborative relationships with cabinet members and keeping the President informed on drug issues. He develops the NDCS, consolidates the national drug control budget, reviews, and certifies other agencies’ drug control budgets, and

presents the drug policies before the Congress of the United States. The director is also responsible for coordinating, and overseeing changes to narcotics-related programs, and policies of the federal departments, agencies and bureaus. The President also tasked the director with recommending changes in the organization, management, and budgets of federal agencies involved in the counterdrug effort. The director of the ONDCP, under authority vested by the President designates the United States interdiction coordinator (USIC). He is responsible for ensuring that assets for interdiction are adequate, that their use is properly integrated and optimized, and that interdiction efforts and priorities are consistent with overall US international counternarcotics policy.<sup>8</sup> The National Security Strategy is a product of this interaction at the highest level of the nation with a national drug control strategy nested in the national strategy.

The next stage of active participation in the counterdrug offensive at the strategic level incorporates the activities of the various departments of the United States government. The Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Treasury, Transportation, Agriculture, Interior, and Education all develop plans to formulate, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of counterdrug policy and strategy in accordance with the national drug control strategy. The counterdrug (CD) responsibility in the Department of Defense (DoD) rests with the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Several assistant secretaries for Defense (ASD) assist the SecDef in performing these duties. The CJCS provides direction and guidance to the combatant commanders (CINCs) and the CD commanders in the formulation of regional policies and strategies for CD operations. The JCS produces the National Military Strategy, nested in the National Security Strategy, and provides a framework for the

implementation of the policies and strategies for the military. At the operational and tactical levels the CINCs, Defense agencies, and the CD commanders implement the policies and strategies for the DoD.<sup>9</sup>

At the operational level, national and theater leadership translates the broad vision and strategic intent into operational objectives. In the military, the authority of law and regulation achieves synchronization of effort through detailed planning and the application of resources. Government agencies, however, achieve synchronization of planning and operations through cooperation and coordination rather than through authority and regulations.<sup>10</sup> The Department of State (DOS) directs the CD efforts in the international arena at the operational and tactical levels. There is some overlap between the strategic and operational levels at the DOS but its primary responsibility is the planning and implementation of United States foreign policy and providing foreign affairs information on narcotrafficking in foreign countries.

The Department of State, through US ambassadors and country teams, is the lead agency for executing the (national drug control strategy) in foreign nations. Military commands are just some of many US agencies supporting host nations by coordinating support for their counterdrug efforts.<sup>11</sup>

The Secretary of State directs the activities of the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL); the Agency for International Development (AID); and the United States Country Teams in the department's CD effort. The US Embassy country teams is the tool used by ambassadors to translate the policies and strategies of the national security strategy and the drug control strategy into operational direction for the host nation (HN). The country teams are task organized depending on the host nation, the situation in the country, and the magnitude of the

United States effort for that particular country. The country teams also coordinate their efforts with those of the combatant commanders (CINCs) in charge of that geographical region.<sup>12</sup>

The Country Team meets for many reasons, but when it assembles to coordinate in-country counternarcotics actions, it is usually chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission. Principal players with counternarcotic interests can include the Secretary Assistance Office (SAO), Chief of Station, DEA Narcotics Attaché, INS Attaché, Customs Attaché, Narcotics Assistance Unit (Department of State, International Narcotics matters), FBI Legal Attaché, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Information Service, and the Defense Attaché.<sup>13</sup>

The Department of Justice (DOJ) supports the counterdrug effort through the activities of seven agencies or bureaus. Its role is the prevention and detection of drug-related crime, the enforcement of drug-related civil laws, criminal laws, prohibition on illegal uses of controlled substances, and application of internal revenue laws to ensure the payment of taxes. The agencies and bureaus under the supervision of the DOJ are the *Federal Bureau of Investigation* (FBI), the *Drug Enforcement Administration* (DEA), the *Immigration and Naturalization Service* (INS), US Border Patrol (USBP), US Attorney; *International Criminal Police Organization* (INTERPOL), US *National Central Bureau* (USNCB), and the *US Marshals' Service*.<sup>14</sup>

The Department of the Treasury (TREAS) conducts its CD effort through the following subordinate organizations: *US Customs Service*, *Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms*, *Internal Revenue Service*, US Secret Service, and the *Federal Law Enforcement Training Center*. The key players in the organization are the Under Secretary of Enforcement and the Commissioner of the *Internal Revenue Service*. The US Customs Service is the lead agency for land interdiction and is co-lead agency with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) for air interdiction. The US Customs Service has

maritime interdiction authority within the US twelve mile sea limit and an extensive money laundering control program. Attempts by individuals to “launder” illegal revenues through legitimate businesses may bring them under the jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service. Individuals involved in counterfeiting, money laundering, electronic funds transfer, credit card fraud, and other financial crimes could find themselves under investigation by the Secret Service.<sup>15</sup>

The Department of Transportation (DOT) combats the illegal drug trade through the operations of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The USCG is the lead agency for maritime interdiction and has jurisdiction in United States territorial waters as well as international waters. It is co-lead agency with the USCS for air interdiction. The FAA controls the use of US airspace and assists in identifying airborne drug smugglers by using radar, posting aircraft lookouts, and tracking the movement of suspect aircraft. It also assists the counterdrug effort by investigating violations related to drug smuggling and provides intelligence to law enforcement agencies. At the tactical level, several organizations focus on the identification and investigation of drug traffickers in the domestic and international arenas. They are as follows: organized crime drug enforcement task forces; DEA state and local task Forces; INTERPOL; the US National Guard; law enforcement agencies (LEA); Operation Alliance; Project North Star.<sup>16</sup>

The combatant commanders and CD commanders translate the intent of the strategic guidance into operational plans. They implement these plans at the tactical level by conducting actual CD operations and support operations in the United States and overseas with the support of host nations. Some measure of overlap occurs between the

strategic and operational levels and this also takes place between the operational and tactical levels. The success of the entire model takes place when the guidance of the national leaders are translated into detailed operational plans by the military commanders and implemented by the units, agencies and bureaus involved in counterdrug operations.

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<sup>1</sup> Govt. of Trinidad and Tobago, *National Drug Strategy Master Plan* (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Government Printer, February 1998), 30.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>3</sup> Govt. of Trinidad and Tobago, Strategic Services Agency, *Strategic Services Profile* (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Government Printer, October, 1997), 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Publications, 17 February 1998), III-1.

<sup>5</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, III-3.

<sup>6</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, III-1.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, 2-3.

<sup>9</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, III-3.

<sup>10</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, III-40.

<sup>11</sup> LTC David G. Bradford, "Planning for Victory in the Drug War," *Military Review* 74, No. 10 (October 1994): 22.

<sup>12</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, III-14-16.

<sup>13</sup> Murl D. Mugner and William W. Mendel, "Campaign Planning and the Drug War," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1991), 45.

<sup>14</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, III-7-13.

<sup>15</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, III-17-22.

<sup>16</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, III-23-24.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.<sup>1</sup>

Carl von Clausewitz understood the relationship between politics and war. War he declared was a continuation of political intercourse by other means. The war on drugs must be understood in terms of its political and economic as well as military relationships. The United States and Trinidad and Tobago both have developed models for counterdrug operations and we examined them in the previous chapter. These models have strengths and weaknesses that are manifested in the effectiveness of mission accomplishment as well as political and social impact. The analysis of the data presented begins with the examination of the two models separately in two similar matrixes (tables 1 and 2). The matrixes contain the different state apparatus involved in counterdrug operations and the different levels of MOOTW and the different instruments of national power. The levels of MOOTW are strategic, operational, and tactical, while the instruments of power are diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The study examines the portfolios of the various government departments, agencies, bureaus, councils, and offices with respect to the way they function in the various levels of MOOTW and satisfy the different instruments of power.

MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes. The principles of war generally apply to MOOTW, but sometimes in different

ways and other times with additional principles. Joint Pub 3-0 delineates six principles that govern MOOTW. They are as follows:

1. Objective: Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective
2. Unity of Effort: Seek unity of effort in every operation
3. Security: Never permit hostile fractions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage
4. Restraint: Apply appropriate military capability prudently
5. Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims
6. Legitimacy: Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operations and of the host government, where applicable.<sup>2</sup>

The principles of MOOTW are important considerations in the development of a national effort to overcome the effects of the drug trade on the nation. The use of the instrument of national power must also be considered in the context of the different levels and the principles of MOOTW.

These matrixes clearly bring out the areas of overlap among the various departments, agencies and bureaus involved in counterdrug operations. They also help you to understand the complexity of counterdrug operations and the areas that require cooperation and coordination at the various levels. The different levels of MOOTW require input from the various organizational players to produce a cohesive effort, and omissions or failures at one level affect the performance of the organizations and players at the other levels and the overall national effort as well. The instruments of national

power also require inputs from the various organizations and players. Coordination and cooperation are also required as there is overlap and multiple tasking of some players.

The level of collaboration between the military and the civilian security organizations is very low. The military with its hierarchical establishment based on a reliance on authority, laws and regulations many times comes into conflict with the civilian led organizations or para-military organizations based on cooperation and coordination. The areas of possible conflict as well as the areas that require joint action and team work emerge out when the matrixes are examined.

At the strategic level of MOOTW, the major players in the Trinidad and Tobago model are the Prime Minister's Office, the National Security Council, the Defence Council, and the Ministries of National Security and External Affairs (table 1). They are responsible for the formulation of policy and the strategic direction of the counterdrug effort. They establish the broad policy with the strategic objectives, concepts, and priorities for the resources involved in the counterdrug thrust. These national leaders have the task of determining what the national policy will be and how they support the national interests. These organizations exercise the diplomatic and economic instruments of power, in particular the Ministries of National Security and External Affairs. These ministries interact with regional and international organizations in the pursuit of national interests.

At the operational level of MOOTW in Trinidad and Tobago, the headquarters of the Defence Force and Police Service and the Office of the Attorney General spearhead the counterdrug operations. The government agencies, branches, and departments, such as the Customs and Excise, SSA, SIA, and JOCC, support the efforts of the major CD

players. They translate the vision of the national leaders and the strategic intent of the national policies and directives into operational objectives. These government agencies, in particular the Police Special Branch, SSA, and SIA provide the counterdrug community with intelligence on the detection and prevention of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals. They also provide intelligence data on the collection, analysis, production, transportation, and distribution of illicit drugs to the military and police headquarters spearheading the counterdrug effort. In addition, these organizations exercise military and informational instruments of power in support of national interests. They also conduct detailed planning of military and para-military operations at their own headquarters and ensure synchronization of effort within their respective organizations. The different combatant commanders are required to ensure cooperation and coordination among organizations and agencies.

In the United States at the strategic level of MOOTW, the Executive Office of the President spearheads the counterdrug effort through the National Security Council and the Office of the National Drug Control Policy.

In general, the NSC focuses its energy in developing policy recommendations to the President for the OCONUS effort while the ONDCP orients on a stateside policy. There is a great deal of overlap, and ONDCP representatives attend many of the relevant NSC interagency meetings. Interagency groups constitute the principal mechanism for developing advice and recommendations for presidential considerations.<sup>3</sup>

The Director of the ONDCP, or the “Drug Czar,” oversees and coordinates national, regional, and international functions of all executive agencies and ensures that those functions sustain and complement the government’s overall counterdrug effort.<sup>4</sup> The contribution of the Drug Czar is of strategic importance to the overall success of the

United States counterdrug effort. The Drug Czar is responsible for developing a consolidated national drug control budget; coordinating and overseeing programs and policies, and recommending changes in the organization, management, and budgets of federal organizations. This places the synchronization of the budget in the counterdrug effort in an office under the authority and law of the Executive Office of the President. The administrative functions that are crucial at the operational level of MOOTW, where joint interlocking of military and civilian-organizations is necessary, are coordinated in the ONDCP.

The level of shared responsibilities required in the United States model is demonstrated when the matrix is examined (table 2). The wisdom of appointing the director of ONDCP as a coordinator of the overall drug operations is also apparent. There are too many actors and organizations involved in the counterdrug undertaking for it to be successful without some form of centralized standardization and synchronization. The need for harmony among the instruments of national power as well as the levels of MOOTW is also possible with centralization of coordination.

The Executive Office of the President produces the *National Security Strategy*, which sets forth the strategic objectives and concepts that will be applied using the instruments of national power in the diplomatic, informational, military and economic arenas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff produces the *National Military Strategy* that states its intent to shape, respond, and prepare now--a military strategy for a new era.

This document conveys my advice and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces in implementing the guidance in the President's A National Security Strategy for a New Century and the Secretary's Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review.<sup>5</sup>

These documents and the *National Drug Control Strategy* (NDCS) provide the commanders and the organizations at the operational and tactical levels of MOOTW with the guidance to conduct detailed planning and implement objectives and missions. The synchronization of the counterdrug effort at the highest level of government by the national civilian and military leaders also involve them in the use of the instruments of national power at the apex of the federal system of government. The Executive Office of the President and its subordinate organizations, as well as the hierarchy of the military, are involved in the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic arenas.

At the operational level of MOOTW, the national and theater leadership translates the strategic objectives, concepts, and priorities of resources into operational plans and objectives. The combatant commander interprets the national and military strategies into plans and objectives for a particular geographical theater and designs a mechanism for its implementation. The combatant commander will then use the instruments of power to achieve the national strategy in the diplomatic, informational, and military arenas.

The component commanders in the various theaters implement the tactical missions that result from the strategic objectives and the operational plans. In the regional and international arenas the corresponding organizations in host nations (HN) support these plans, objectives, and missions and the United States combatant commanders support the HN as part of the overall United States foreign policy strategy. The CINC USSOUTHCOM is the combatant commander responsible for counterdrug operations in the Latin American and Caribbean regions.

USSOUTHCOM supports the President's National Drug Control Strategy by actions that are broadly outlined in its SOUTHCOS Strategy and placed into operation in three regional campaign plans. The three campaign plans orient on

Central America and the Caribbean, the Andean Ridge (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru) and the Southern Cone. While the SOUTHCOM strategy and campaign plans reflect a number of concerns, such as access to minerals and raw materials, insurgencies, democratization, and regional emigration, a common theme is assisting host nations to defeat narcotrafficking.<sup>6</sup>

CINC USSOUTHCOM works with the diplomatic missions to the various host nations to translate the policy and strategy into operational direction for United States forces and agencies that support the host nation counterdrug forces. CINC USSOUTHCOM provides a mixed package of security assistance and civil-military operations. The package included foreign military financing program (FMFP), foreign military sales, and international military education and training (IMET) funded programs, equipment, services, and training. Civil-military support to host nation can include civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), military information support teams (MIST), and humanitarian assistance (HA).

The United States CD model evolved during the 1980s from a pattern based on competition among government civilian organizations, and military organizations, to today's model based on synchronization, cooperation and coordination.

During the 1980s, government, at all levels, was unprepared for what was to become known as the "war on Drugs." The drug problem was relegated primarily to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) who directed their efforts and resources at supply reduction

There was little unity of effort among many Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) at local, state, and national levels. In fact, the pattern of competition among the DLEAs, motivated in part by a budgeting based on the amount of illicit drugs seized. At the federal level, over thirty-five agencies have some degree of involvement and responsibilities in the war on drugs. To further complicate matters, over eighty congressional committees have some degree of oversight in the CD effort.

The DoD's role in the war on drugs, up to 1989, was minimal at best. Congress had been pressuring the Executive Branch to more actively engage the DoD in CD operations, which did not violate the strict provisions of the law or reduce combat readiness.<sup>7</sup>

The United States military involvement in counterdrug operations in the 1980s was minimal as most military personnel were preoccupied with the Cold War and did not view MOOTW as warfighting and feared that it detracted the military from its primary mission:

Defending the United States from nuclear or conventional attack and projecting U.S. military power abroad in Defense of U.S. national interests. They worried that DoD could not afford to take on this new mission unless substantial additional funding was allocated.<sup>8</sup>

Many military personnel still adhere to this view today but the growing importance of the need for involvement in MOOTW is modifying the perceptions of the military community in this post Cold War era.

The formulation and implementation of a NDCS in 1989 by the Bush administration was a turning point in United States counterdrug strategy.

This Report is the product of an unprecedented national effort over many months. America's fight against epidemic illegal drug use cannot be won on any single front alone; it must be waged everywhere--at every level of Federal, State and local government and by every citizen in every community across the country. Accordingly, we have conducted a thorough, intensive, and unflinching review of Federal anti-drug efforts to date. And we have solicited advice and recommendations from hundreds of interested and involved anti-drug leaders outside the Federal Government. The result is a comprehensive blue print for the new direction and effort--and for success in the near- and long-term future.<sup>9</sup>

The essential elements in the United States counterdrug strategy for the new millennium are the unity of effort, synchronization, cooperation, and coordination from the national leaders to the tactical units implementing the missions that support the strategy. President Bush declared that it must be waged everywhere, at every level, by every citizen, and in every community. The unstated fact, however, is that the direction



and strategy for the counterdrug effort must come from the national leaders and must be implemented by the military throughout its chain of command. The government bureaucracy must also implement the strategy throughout its departments, bureaus, and agencies.

The Trinidad and Tobago model is not as comprehensive as the United States model, and much can be learned from the latter. At the strategic level, the Trinidad and Tobago model lacks the documented, concrete strategy from its national leaders. It is similar to the United States model in that it also operates at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of MOOTW. The Prime Minister's office is involved through his chairmanship of the National Security Council that includes other government and military leaders. The council provides guidance and direction for the military and the government civilian bureaucracy. The NSC, however, does not produce a written National Security Strategy but has put the mechanisms in place for the production of a written national drug control masterplan. There is guidance and direction from the NSC but there are many inconsistencies because of this lack of a written document. A major fatality of this system is a lack of continuity in the National Security Strategy whenever there is a change of government through the electoral process, as occurred after the last three general elections. Without a written National Security Strategy, the new government leaders do not have a blueprint in which to work. If this situation is compounded by changes within the military and bureaucratic leaders as well, there is a loss of cohesion and direction that hampers the counterdrug effort.

Trinidad and Tobago is now in the process of formulating and implementing a national drug strategy master plan. The plan identifies supply reduction and demand

reduction as the types of interventions for priority action. In the area of supply reduction the plan stresses the need for the following:

1. Defining the problem to enable more effective and specific employment of available resources.
2. Protect territorial borders from the entry of drugs to ensure that there is no traffic in drugs that are not produced locally.
3. Identify, investigate and prosecute to conviction, drug traffickers and dismantle trafficking networks to reduce the number of traffickers in operation and act, as a deterrent to would be traffickers.
4. Eliminate and prevent local drug production.
5. Strengthen the Criminal Justice System.
6. Prevent laundering of the proceeds of drugs and confiscate criminally derived assets.
7. Promote a coordinated approach towards drug interdiction.
8. Encourage regional and international cooperation.
9. Eliminate the illegal traffic in arms and ammunition.
10. Eliminate corruption.
11. Mobilize public support.
12. Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy.<sup>10</sup>

The plan addresses the following issues in the area of demand reduction:

1. Improved public education and information to increase participation in community prevention activities and reduce involvement in drug use and related activities.
2. Promote school preventative education to develop sustainable drug prevention modules integrated into the primary and secondary curriculum, train teachers, develop healthy lifestyle activities and adopt drug policy guidelines.
3. Facilitate the development of community prevention programs to provide healthy alternatives for the population and to reduce those factors that lead to drug use.
4. Promote and enhance treatment and rehabilitation services, including programs for those addicts identified through the criminal justice system..
5. Encourage and facilitate the development of Employee Assistance Programs geared towards health promotion, early intervention, and treatment and rehabilitation of individuals in both the public and private sectors.
6. Strengthen research to provide reliable information for policy and administrative decision making and to ensure the efficient and effective development and conduct of programs and projects.
7. Foster and promote regional and international cooperation in order to avoid duplication and wastage of effort, share valuable information and intelligence, and tap all available expertise and resources.

8. The reformation of the National Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Program to create a quasi autonomous and professional statutory body.<sup>11</sup>

In the United States the NDCS states in part:

For the first time, the federal government had developed and publicly articulated a complete, sophisticated, and finely differentiated understanding of drugs as a public policy issue. The strategy clearly acknowledged the visible effects of widespread drug use: rising rates of violent crime, serious damage to the nation's health and economy, and strains on vital relationships with international allies, for example . . . . But at the same time, the President's strategy advanced a vigorous argument against continuation of the largely reactive, uncoordinated, and piecemeal efforts of past anti-drug campaigns.<sup>12</sup>

The key words for acknowledgement here are reactive, uncoordinated, and piecemeal. A successful counterdrug effort requires coordination, synchronization, and cooperation among all parties involved.

In recent years, the Trinidad and Tobago government appointed a standing committee on crime with a mandate to monitor, follow-up and ensure the implementation of its recommendations of for approval by the Minister of National Security. Other equally destructive by-products of the drug trade are rising violent crime, widespread drug use, and damage to the nation's health and economy. These symptoms of the drug trade are realities and they demand a response from the authorities in the form of a comprehensive national drug control strategy. Crime is therefore being scrutinized but in isolation from drugs and not as a part of a comprehensive strategy. A NSS and a NDCS bring various positive factors to the table in the counterdrug effort. They bring a vision of how the country is going to conduct a national counterdrug effort, of what the government needs to do to achieve success and how the nation can secure an end state.

There is therefore a necessity in Trinidad and Tobago at the strategic level to have the vision and guidance of the national leaders in written form. A national security strategy and the defence policy would be the best vehicle for the exposition of the strategic intent of the national leaders. This would provide the organizations involved in counterdrug operations with the tools necessary for a joint and integrated undertaking. The counterdrug endeavor in Trinidad and Tobago as stated earlier is patterned after the United States counterdrug enterprise prior to the late 1980s. Three entities at the operational and tactical levels conduct the counterdrug venture in Trinidad and Tobago. These divisions are the Defence Force, the Police Service, and the other government agencies.

The other government agencies would include the increasing role being played by the office of the Attorney General. The importance of combating the drug traffickers in the legal arena and the financial system has gained importance over the years. Legislation was passed to seize the property and assets of persons convicted of criminal activity as a result of their involvement in the drug trade. The assets and property are then used by the government in combating the drug trade or in providing comfort or rehabilitation of the victims of the drug trade. This is breaking new ground in Trinidad and Tobago and many prominent citizens have advised a cautious approach for a number of reasons. The example of the United States Model is of significance as there are differing schools of thought on this particular aspect of counterdrug operations.

Forfeiture laws have not simply enhanced the ability of law enforcement to do its job, but rather have changed the nature of the job itself." Both the crime prevention and due process goals of our criminal justice system are comprised when salaries, continued tenure, equipment, modernization, and budgets depend on how much money can be generated by forfeitures.

. . . the ability of law enforcement agencies to financially benefit from forfeited assets, and the provision of large block grants from Congress to fight the drug trade “ have distorted government policy making and law enforcement.<sup>13</sup>

The office of the Attorney General continues to be of great importance to the counterdrug effort in terms of the additional sources of funding, the threat of prosecution, and the seizure of the assets of the criminals involved in drug trafficking.

The role of the Defence Force presently is minimal, as there is no comprehensive counterdrug effort and operations are usually the result of the following:

1. Targets of opportunity that present themselves through information collected from patrols or interaction between Defence Force personnel and persons involved in the drug trade.
2. Request for military assistance from the Police Service when it perceives that the risk of death or injury to policemen involved in the counterdrug operation is great.
3. Operations based on the provision of intelligence by one of the government agencies involved in counterdrug operations.

The main routes for drugs from the mainland of South America is across the Gulf of Paria (the channel that separates Trinidad from Venezuela in South America) to Trinidad (figure 1). The means of transportation is by boat, in many forms from commercial vessels, fishing trawlers, and fishing pirogues to pleasure craft. The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard is the organization tasked with maritime and air interdiction in Trinidad and Tobago. The success of the Coast Guard in drug interdiction on the sea and in the air is minimal, just as the record of the Regiment on land is also minimal. This is because the Defence Force remains on the periphery of counterdrug operations in Trinidad and Tobago. The Defence Force effort in counterdrug operations is limited to

the information and intelligence it gathers for itself and even this is subjected to inter-unit rivalry between the Regiment and the Coast Guard.

The climate in Trinidad and Tobago creates an environment where there are a lot of avenues for all sorts of hindrances to the planning and implementation of counterdrug operations. Organizational rivalry, competition for funding, organizational pride, mistrust after the failure of an operation, and a desire to withhold vital intelligence from another organization are some of the problems that are experienced in such a climate. The problems of the Joint Operations Command Center are an example of organizational mistrust and uncoordinated and uncooperative accommodation.

The JOCC is the brainchild of the incumbent special adviser to the Prime Minister and its purpose is to provide Trinidad and Tobago's forces with an up-to-date, state of the art facility for the national counterdrug effort. The JOCC would provide a forum where representatives from the different counterdrug organizations and agencies would have twenty-four hour access to vital information and intelligence of narco-trafficking. Representatives of all organizations and agencies would also man the facility and they would have direct access to their own commanders for contingencies or follow-up action. The JOCC would also provide daily intelligence briefings for all organizations and agencies involved in counterdrug operations, thus creating an atmosphere of synchronization, coordination, and cooperation.

The JOCC, however, never lived up to its potential or the expectation of the special adviser as it was seen as just another rival in the national arena for success in counterdrug operations. The reason for this failure was the lack of an overall national strategy that incorporates all the players on the national scene; a strategy that would

enunciate in detail the vision, objectives, and concepts of the national stratagem. The other actors needed to understand certain facts to gain their cooperation:

1. How the JOCC fits into the national scheme of things.
2. The benefits of the JOCC to the counterdrug effort
3. How the Special Adviser planned to support the counterdrug efforts of the government agencies through the JOCC.
4. How the other government organizations could support the JOCC so that it would accomplish its objectives.

The JOCC is a very important and powerful tool that can have a tremendous impact on counterdrug operations in Trinidad and Tobago. Yet, its role in the counterdrug effort, like the Defence Force's role is minimal.

Operational planning for counterdrug operations is therefore left to the different headquarters, without synchronization and coordination. The Defence Force plans military operations and the Police Service plans its own operations. The police special branch and the Defence Force J2 branch are providers of intelligence for their respective organizations. The government agencies like the SSA provide both organizations with intelligence on narco-traffickers and their activities, but this is not a structured avenue and easily becomes a pawn in inter-agency/inter-organization rivalry. Personalities, and past contact and links play a major role in the passage of intelligence among the different actors in the counterdrug operations. Passage of information to organizations may be determined by the accuracy of the intelligence and the media coverage that success or failure may bring.

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force is involved at the operational and tactical levels of MOOTW with inputs at the strategic level through the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who sits on both the National Security and Defence Councils. The special adviser to the Prime Minister also has input at the level of the National Security Council. The national leaders' vision for national security and defence should be clearly articulated to the military in the national security strategy with the defence policy nested in that strategy. The vision for counterdrug operations should also be nested in these important documents. The role of the Chief of Defence Staff as a vital link between the military leaders and the national leaders cannot be overemphasized. The CDS is the only person who is a member of the military, the National Security Council, and the Defence Council. The CDS is a conduit of the broad vision, concepts, and priorities of the national leaders to the military leaders and enlisted personnel. In like manner, the CDS is also a conduit of the military discipline, loyalty, commitment, and professionalism to the national leaders. The Defence Force is the military instrument of national power and functions primarily at the operational and tactical levels of MOOTW.

The roles and functions of the special adviser to the Prime Minister are of importance at the strategic level of MOOTW and the employment of the instruments of national power. The special adviser is a direct link between the office of the Prime Minister and the military. He advises the Prime Minister on military matters and is a member of the National Security Council. The special adviser is a very senior military officer with extensive military experience and exposure at the highest levels of government bureaucracy. The special adviser is therefore another important conduit between the military and the national leaders. His presence on the National Security



Council is additional support for the military at the highest level of national strategy. The involvement of the special adviser at the operational level of MOOTW through his overseeing of the JOCC is an indication that the national leaders envision a role for a senior member of the military in the synchronization and coordination of counterdrug operations. The role of the special adviser should be taken a step further in the synchronization and coordination of the counterdrug effort.

At the operational level of MOOTW the Defence Force administers three headquarters: Defence Force headquarters, Regimental headquarters, and Coast Guard headquarters. Defence Force headquarters is the divisional level headquarters and oversees the operational activities of Regimental headquarters, the brigade level headquarters, and the Coast Guard headquarters that conduct maritime and air operations. The Defence Force headquarters task is to translate the broad vision of the national leaders into operational objectives for the Regiment and Coast Guard commanders. These broad visions should be contained in the national security strategy and the defence policy, but both of these documents are lacking. The result of this deficiency is an absence of written guidance from the national leaders to the military leaders. The term written guidance is used as direction is available to the military hierarchy but it is at times mercurial and at other times inconsistent.

The absence of a defence policy hampers the effectiveness and efficiency of the Defence Force at the operational and tactical levels of MOOTW in a number of ways. Firstly, the operational tasking of the Land Forces and the Maritime Forces in counterdrug operations is not clearly delineated. The Regiment and the Coast Guard commanders both have responsibilities in counterdrug operations, but the guidance that

would allow them to fully understand their operational boundaries is not clearly articulated. The potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation of functions as they relate to counterdrug operations throughout the islands is always present.

The lack of a broad policy at the strategic level of MOOTW, from which operational commanders could gain guidance and intent, translates into incomprehension and involvement in other activities on the part of operational commanders. There are many officers in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force who like their counterparts in the United States military, see the involvement in MOOTW as a distraction from their main purpose, i.e. warfighting. Trinidad and Tobago survived several challenges to its democracy in the years since independence from Britain in 1962. In 1970, it was the Black Power Revolution and an uprising by junior military officers. In the late 1970s and early 1980s it was the National Union of Freedom Fighters who led a guerrilla movement against the civil authorities. In 1990 it was the Jamaat al Muslimeen, a fundamentalist Muslim group that attempted an armed overthrow of the state after a disagreement with the government over a land dispute. They were defeated and captured but The Privy Council of the United Kingdom, our Supreme Court, freed the Muslimeen after a lengthy trial. The Muslimeen did not renounce violence and threatens a future resumption of hostilities, as the land dispute remains unresolved. There are consistent reports that the Muslimeen have become involved in the illegal drug trade in order to finance their efforts at re-arming themselves and re-building their organization. These threats to democracy over the last thirty years are seen by many officers as the area where the main effort of the military must focus as these are the real threats to the nation's stability.

The activities of the narco-traffickers are seen as a matter of law and order which is in the province of the civil powers through the Police Service. Many officers at the tactical level do not understand the complexity of the drug menace to society nor the effects that the drug war will have on the military in the long term. Many officers believe that the military should concentrate its training, intelligence gathering, and operational planning for the next battle with the Muslimeen or any movement that threatens national security and not on counterdrug operations or MOOTW. The officers therefore claim that warfighting is the purpose behind the existence of the Defence Force, and MOOTW is distracting the military from its purpose and using up its limited resources.

In recent years there have been a number of attempts at the restructuring of the Defence Force and in particular the Regiment. The end of the Cold War and the downsizing of the western armies and the increasing cost of the purchase and maintenance of military equipment has had its effects on the Defence Force and the Regiment in particular. Many politicians and private citizens have called for a downsizing of the military and several formulas for a new structured force have been contemplated. The threat posed by the Muslimeen led the military planners to propose an army of two infantry battalions supported by engineers and combat service support to ensure the flexibility for maneuver at the operational level. In 1999 however, one infantry battalion was re-formed into an engineer battalion and the second infantry battalion is to be re-created in the future. The rationale behind the restructuring was the increasing demand being placed on the squadron of engineers to respond to the threat of natural disasters. Trinidad and Tobago is in the hurricane belt and one of the few Commonwealth Caribbean islands with a standing military. It is expected to provide a quick humanitarian

relief to the other islands damaged by tropical hurricanes or other natural disasters by the other CARICOM nations. The citizens of Trinidad and Tobago also harbor expectations that its military will provide humanitarian assistance domestically in the aftermath of a hurricane or natural disaster. Many officers, however, see the recent restructuring of the Regiment from two infantry battalions to one infantry and one engineer battalion as additional proof that the leadership's concern about MOOTW is seriously affecting warfighting.

The restructuring was done in the absence of a written national security strategy or a defence policy and the officers interpreted this as a major shift in the focus of military strategy by the national leadership. This restructuring of the Regiment was accompanied by the creation of new senior staff appointments of staff officers land forces and maritime at the Defence Force level. This is an indication that the national leaders have recognized the importance of detailed planning at the operational level.

Defence Force officers, both land and maritime however, without the guidance of a defence policy or a drug control policy, are not transitioning to the threat posed by the drug menace but are quite contented to spend their tour of duty on operational alert for the next Muslimeen uprising. In Trinidad and Tobago the infantry units/sub-units rotate their tours of duty among training, guard duties, and operational standby. The commanders are therefore reluctant to commit troops to drug eradication and interdiction operations but would rather concentrate on improving their warfighting skills. The infantry officers therefore are quite pleased to concentrate on training and planning for warfighting and to leave MOOTW to the combat support and combat service support units.

The maritime commanders do not have this rotation problem but they nevertheless find that their units are involved in routine training and maritime patrols or operational search and rescue, and drug interdiction. Some Coast Guard officers also adhere to the minority view that involvement in drug interdiction distracts the Coast Guard from its warfighting skills. This is especially problematic when the unit is called on to mount quick response operations that are based on limited information that is provided in an untimely manner or has not been analyzed to provide reliable intelligence. The Coast Guard however remains the primary agent for maritime drug interdiction but does not have the funding or task organization for large-scale intelligence gathering on narcotrafficking.

The cost of purchasing and maintaining the Coast Guard fleet and aircraft is a particular source of anxiety for the officers and enlisted men. As a sovereign power Trinidad and Tobago has concerns about its territorial waters and its economic zone. Trinidad and Tobago has a history of minor maritime conflict with Venezuela in the Gulf of Paria due to the close proximity of the two nations. These minor incidents however are of importance to the Coast Guard officers in the purchase and maintenance of the Coast Guard fleet so that it can respond to any threat to our sovereignty. The cost of purchasing and maintaining ships and aircraft is very high. The types of ships and aircraft required for projection of national interests in territorial waters and the economic zone are different from those required for maritime drug interdiction and counterdrug operations. In an atmosphere of limited funding and reduced resources many officers are concerned that increased involvement in MOOTW would further erode the funds available for the purchase and maintenance of ships and aircraft for their primary mission.

The concerns of the officers of the Defence Force on its effects on their warfighting skills and budget allocations are genuine but the increased involvement in MOOTW is not detrimental to the Force. The Defence Force has the inherent skills and capability to effectively manage MOOTW and warfighting. The infrastructure is present and the leadership is capable of managing the situation once it focuses its attention correctly. The Defence Force must change the minimal role that it is presently playing in combating the illegal drug trade in Trinidad and Tobago. The role of the Defence Force in counterdrug operations is crucial, as it possesses a wealth of experience and training in a very incisive area of counterdrug operations, that is coordination and synchronization.

Counterdrug operations cannot and must not be viewed in a partisan manner. It is not solely the responsibility of the law enforcement agencies or the civil authorities. The military cannot continue to pay lip service to counterdrug operations and claim that it is distracting them from improving their warfighting skills. Intelligence reports indicate, as was mentioned previously, that the Muslimeen are using the illegal drug trade as a means of financing their efforts at re-arming and re-building their organization. This would provide a nexus between the illegal drug trade and the threat to national security. A successful counterdrug strategy would also result in a successful national security strategy. The success of the counterdrug operations can provide a number of benefits to the military in its quest to improve its warfighting skills as follows:

1. It will provide the military with opportunity to improve its operational capabilities through the conducting of counterdrug operations.
2. It will help improve the military operational planning skills.

3. It will provide intelligence that can be used by the military in improving national security.

4. It will provide training opportunities at the tactical level for combat, combat support and combat service support unity.

5. It will provide training to units at the tactical level on other MOOTW operations.

The military must incorporate counterdrug operations into its defence policy and work at improving its skills at both MOOTW and warfighting as this would benefit the military and the nation as a whole.

One of the main problems with the Trinidad and Tobago model for counterdrug operations are that it lacks coordination and synchronization. The counterdrug effort is piecemeal and inadequate. The different organizations involved in counterdrug operations, that is, military, police and government agencies do not work well together. Many hours of detailed intelligence work are lost because of organization rivalry, or opportunities are missed because of lack of equipment or resources that another organization possesses but is unwilling or unable to share.

Counterdrug operations also seems to have the ability to fall through the cracks in the system. It is a “new boy on the block” and the different organizations already have their comfort zones that require their undivided attention. The police are concerned with providing law and order or combating crime; the military is concerned with warfighting and the other government agencies lack the resources to adequately address counterdrug operations without the input of either the police or the army. All these national organizations understand the necessity of the counterdrug effort and are willing to play

their part in eradicating the drug menace. They are limited in their knowledge of the overall complexity of the menace and concentrate on the area that their organizations are involved in to satisfy their limited objectives. The Trinidad and Tobago counterdrug effort lacks cohesion. The sum total of the efforts of the individual parts of the national organizations does not add up to the overall total effort that is required in combating the illegal drug trade.

At the strategic level, it is necessary to have a vision and guidance from the national leaders so that the nation can have a cohesive and comprehensive counterdrug effort. At the operational level, coordination and synchronization of MOOTW are necessary ingredients for a successful counterdrug program. The Defence Force has apparatus, expertise, and experience to provide this coordination and synchronization. The counterdrug effort is a national undertaking and all organizations involved must approach the problem from this perspective. The piecemeal and awkward approach to counterdrug operations should be a thing of the past. The Defence Force has a responsibility to the national community to bring its training, discipline, and resources to the forefront of this issue and to ensure that a synchronized and coordinated national effort is initiated. At the tactical level where the operational plans are translated to actual counterdrug missions, the need for coordination and cooperation among the various government organizations is paramount and the Defence Force has the wherewithal to lead the way forward.

The police normally perform the tactical missions detailed by the government agencies with the assistance of Defence Force personnel. This is in accordance with the role of the Defence Force to function in aid of the civil power. The Defence Force, with



the exception of the Coast Guard and matters concerning maritime law, must rely on the police service to conduct investigations, searches, and arrests of persons suspected or engaged in criminal activities. Joint operations involving military personnel, police service personnel, and other governmental agency personnel are common at the tactical level. It is at this level that organizational rivalry and the piecemeal approach to the counterdrug effort are most noticeable. Yet, it is here that collaboration and team work are most needed, as in many instances the military require the cooperation of the police to make arrests and the police and other agencies require the security that the military can provide. The military is also able to provide the experience and expertise that results from its military training and familiarity with the terrain or waters throughout Trinidad and Tobago, while the police and other government agencies are able to provide intelligence data on the operations of the narcotraffickers. The need for joint action is crucial for a successful national counterdrug effort at all levels of MOOTW, not only at the tactical level.

The Defence Force is also able to provide the link between the Trinidad and Tobago organizations involved in counterdrug operations and the USSOUTHCOM. This will provide the host nation with access to support for SOUTHCOM in accordance with its counterdrug strategy objectives. Some of these objectives areas are as follows:

1. Eliminating and preventing the production and transshipment of illegal drugs into the United States
2. Enhancing host nation capabilities to establish positive control over sovereign territory (air, land, maritime, and riverine)

3. Enhancing host nation capabilities to interdict and arrest drug traffickers

4. Enhancing host nation's military professionalism

5. Enhancing host nation capabilities to combat and defeat drug-related insurgent and terrorist threat<sup>4</sup>

This link will provide government organizations with access to a range of support for counterdrug operations that include security assistance, civil-military operations, and detection and monitoring of narcotrafficking. It will include coordination and cooperation with non Department of Defense bureaus and agencies and support to United States law enforcement agencies within Trinidad and Tobago.

The security assistance programs and the civil-military operations that the United States provides will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the counterdrug effort in a number of ways. These programs and operations can be tailored to meet the circumstances that are present in the host nation and will provide the following:

1. Equipment to meet the threat to internal defence and development

2. Services to ensure follow-on equipment support in the form of:

a. Quality Assurance Teams (receive, inspect, and if necessary repair equipment provided to the host nation)

b. Technical Analysis Teams (deployed when a host nation experiences difficulties in maintaining United States equipment or managing techniques)

c. Training

(1) Mobile Training Teams (MTT) [tailored to host nation training requirements]

(2) Extended Training Service Specialists [teams of longer duration]

(3) Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT) [training in non-equipment-specific military skills over a long period]

(4) International Military Education and Training (IMET)

(5) Joint Combined Exercise for Training (JCET)

3. Civil-military assistance, advise, coordination and analysis to counterdrug operations:

a. Information and analysis on narco-traffickers

b. Bilateral cooperative programs aimed at reducing the supply, demand, and trafficking of illegal drugs,

c. Collateral intelligence support to counterdrug efforts through contacts with host nation personnel, and

d. Psychological operations.

This assistance will be invaluable in improving the counterdrug effort by the government agencies in Trinidad and Tobago at the operational and tactical levels. It would benefit all the various organizations that are involved in the counterdrug effort and cannot be limited to the military aspect exclusively.

A new Trinidad and Tobago model for counterdrug operations will depend on a number of factors that would have to be addressed at the strategic level and the outcome is somewhat uncertain. It would depend on the ability of the senior Defence Force leaders to convince the national leaders of the necessity of producing written strategic documents. These documents are crucial, as they will provide the leaders at the

operational and tactical levels the vision and guidance necessary to prepare operational plans and to execute tactical missions. The certainty of the outcome is not guaranteed, as the senior military leaders are subject to civilian control and as such they would have to persuade the national leaders that a comprehensive and cohesive national effort at counterdrug operations is in the best interest of the nation. There will be suspicion of the intent and motives of military leaders who are interested in obtaining written vision and guidance from national leaders. This is especially so when it is something new and not the established norm in the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership.

Funding for counterdrug operations is another area where the model would definitely experience difficulties. Counterdrug operations are presently funded within the allocated budgets of the different government organizations. This, as was mentioned previously results in competition and rivalry for resources, results, and additional funding. Organizations are unwilling to cooperate and to share information a counterpart that it perceives is a rival with the government for additional funding based on the outcome of its counterdrug operations. The need for additional funding for counterdrug operations that is separate and apart from the normal fiscal allocation for the organizations involved is very important.

Funding is a major insufficiency in the outcome of an analysis of the Trinidad and Tobago counterdrug model. It is important as it highlights a problem that organizations involved in the counterdrug operations must come to terms with. The solution to the problem is not easily arrived at, as in all developing countries there are increasing demands for funding by the government of other equally important concerns like health, education, etc. The organizations involved in counterdrug operations also have other

tasks and responsibilities that must also be addressed and catered for from budget allocations. The success of the Trinidad and Tobago model would require a new approach to counterdrug operations. The need for a comprehensive effort that is spearheaded by the government with adequate funding and strategic guidance is necessary so that the society can be mobilized for maximum participation. The benefits of the outcome however should outweigh the insufficiencies and the end state is in the best interest of the national, regional, and international communities.

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans. *Carl von Clausewitz: On War*, (Princeton, N J, Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Publications, 17 February 1998), IV-9.

<sup>3</sup> Murl D. Mugner and William W. Mendel, "Campaign Planning and the Drug War," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1991), 45.

<sup>4</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Publications, 17 February 1998), III-3.

<sup>5</sup> CGSC, *National Military Strategy, C/M/S 500 Shape, Respond, Prepare Now-A Military Strategy for New Era.*, 1.

<sup>6</sup> Murl D. Mugner and William W. Mendel, "Campaign Planning and the Drug War," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1991), 44.

<sup>7</sup> CGSC Handout, *Counterdrug (CD) Operations*, 1.

<sup>8</sup> Peter H. Smith, ed., *Drug Policy in the America*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 130.

<sup>9</sup> Executive Office of the President, ONDCP, *National Drug Control Strategy*, (Washington, DC: September 1989), Transmittal Letter.

<sup>10</sup> Govt. of Trinidad and Tobago, *National Drug Strategy Master Plan* (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Government Printer, February 1998), 5.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>12</sup> Executive Office of the President, 1.

<sup>13</sup> E. Blumenson and E. Nilsen, *Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda*, (University of Chicago Law Review, 65: 1998, Winter), 35-114.

<sup>14</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, 1998, Vi-3.

## CHAPTER 5

### RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The role of Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force in combating the illegal drug trade is minimal at present, with the Coast Guard having the heavier involvement in counterdrug operations. The role of Defence Force in the realm of the drug trade could be compared with that of the United States military prior to 1989. This role reflects the overall approach of the military in Trinidad and Tobago and the overall national approach to counterdrug operations. The approach is piecemeal, lacks cohesion, and is uncoordinated among the major players: the Defence Force, the Police Service, government agencies, and international partners. The infrastructure is in place, however, for a cohesive, coordinated, and synchronized effort in counterdrug operations. The role of the Defence Force can be enhanced through a synchronized effort in national security and drug control at all levels of MOOTW, strategic, operational, and tactical. The Defence Force will have to play a key role in coordinating and synchronizing the counterdrug effort through the involvement of senior military leaders at the strategic and operational levels of MOOTW.

At the strategic level, there are avenues for the senior military leaders to assist the National Security Council and the Defence Council in the production of written national and defence strategies. There are two senior military officers in The National Security Council, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the special adviser to the Prime Minister. These senior officers can be tasked with spearheading the effort to produce a written national security strategy. The national security strategy should contain a broad vision of what the

national leaders ascertain as the strategic objectives of Trinidad and Tobago. The national security strategy should clearly articulate the national interests of Trinidad and Tobago. It should delineate what the vital, important, and other routine interests are and what must be done to support these interests. It should contain instruction as to the strength and weakness of the national position and the opportunities and threats that are available to the nation. It should provide strategic concepts indicating how these objectives can be achieved, what resources are available, and how these resources should be prioritized.

The national security strategy must provide an end state for the national organizations in their pursuit of national interests. The national security strategy must provide the national community with the vision and mission of national security. It must provide guidance for other national and community leaders in the planning, preparation, and production of the strategies of their own organizations. The strategies of the other organizations must be nested in the national security strategy of the national leaders. The role the Defence Force can play in the production of the national security strategy is through the involvement of its senior leaders in the production of a written strategy. Senior military officers have the knowledge, experience, and expertise to assist national leaders in formulating a cohesive national security strategy.

Trinidad and Tobago must increase the role of the Defence Force and in particular the Regiment in the national drug strategy master plan if our counterdrug effort is to be successful. There must be guidance from the highest levels of the nation in the objectives, concepts, priorities, and budgeting for counterdrug operations. The effort required for a comprehensive, synchronized, coordinated, and cooperative drug master plan is tremendous and will require a staff devoted to its accomplishment. An office



dedicated to the formulation and production of a drug control policy is necessary for success. This office would require the blessings and sanction of the Prime Minister's Office for it to achieve success. The special adviser to the Prime Minister could be given the additional task of the directorship of this office. This would place the formulation and production of the drug master plan under the scrutiny of the Prime Minister's Office. It would also require the input of a senior military officer as its director, thereby drawing on the expertise, professionalism, and experience of the military in the formulation of the drug master plan.

The director of the drug master plan should be given the task of consolidating the drug control budgets, as is the case in the United States model. Additional tasks for the director should be coordinating and overseeing drug control programs and recommending changes to the organization, management, and budgets of government organizations involved in the counterdrug effort as is presently done by the "drug czar" in the United States. There should be additional funding for the counterdrug effort and this should not be accredited to the Ministry of National Security but to the office of the Prime Minister. Combating the illegal drug trade is an expensive enterprise and the overburdened budgets of the various ministries should not be required to bear this hardship. There is definitely a case for additional funding to be provided to ensure the success of the counterdrug drug effort. The drug master plan must be national in scope if it is to achieve success. Other government agencies plan like the standing committee on crime, can also be tasked to become involved in the drug master. The mandate of this committee can be broadened to examine the effects that the illegal drug trade is having on crime in Trinidad and Tobago.

The creation of an office for the drug master plan would achieve some of the objectives of the counterdrug effort. It would have a number of beneficial side effects as well:

1. A cohesive and synchronized drug control effort would result.
2. Provide a comprehensive budget for drug control.
3. Provide a consolidated effort for interaction with international partners.
4. Provide a national drug control strategy for the guidance of organizations involved in counterdrug operations.
5. Provide a consolidated avenue for accountability in respect of the counterdrug effort.

The role of the Defence Force would be to provide its expertise and organizational skill in shaping the office for master plan and synchronizing counterdrug operations.

The Defence Council, through the Chief of Defence Staff should formulate and produce a written defence policy. This policy should contain specific objectives for the military in supporting national interests. The defence policy should provide the required guidance for the operational commanders to translate the broad vision of the national security strategy and the drug master plan into operational objectives for their respective commands. The defence policy should provide operational commanders with the military aspect of the instruments of national power through an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the military establishment and the opportunities and threats that are contained in the international environment. The defence policy should contain strategic concepts on how the military will achieve its objectives and what priorities in resources are required to achieve these operational objectives. Operational commanders should be guided by the defence policy on the courses of action available to them to support the

achievement of national interests. The defence policy must be nested in the national security strategy and should serve as an indicator to the national leaders of the commitment of the military to the accomplishment of the strategic objectives set by our civilian authorities. The defence policy should also provide the junior military leaders and those senior commanders who are concerned about the distraction from the primary warfighting skills with information on the importance of MOOTW to the national and military leadership. They would understand where the increased involvement in MOOTW fits into the national scheme of things, why the military is involved, what the objectives are, and what is envisioned as the end state.

The Defence Force is an organization of the state that has a significant role to play at the strategic level of MOOTW and the implementation of the military instrument of national power. The Defence Force brings with it a number of factors that would be of value to those involved in the formulation of strategic objectives, concepts and priorities. The senior officers of the Defence Force who would be involved in the strategic planning process are professionals who have been exposed throughout their careers to strategy formulation and operational planning. These officers also have access to trained staffs who have been involved in strategy formulation and operational planning. The Defence Force brings with it links to international partners who have similar interests in presenting a shared solution to a common but complex problem of international proportions. The role of the Defence Force would be to provide the mechanisms whereby a cohesive, synchronized, and coordinated approach to a shared problem can be understood at the strategic level. This would then increase the degree of success in the

implementation of the strategic objectives set by the national leaders for the Defence Force at the operational and tactical levels of MOOTW.

At the operational level of MOOTW, the Defence Force will have to play a more increasing role from what presently occurs. Presently, the Defence Force remains on the periphery of the counterdrug effort in Trinidad and Tobago, but this must change if the counterdrug effort is to achieve success. Defence Force participation is necessary for a successful counterdrug effort as it brings with it a considerable wealth of experience and expertise in detailed planning and the application of resources at the operational level. The Defence Force brings to counterdrug operations an organization that is hierarchical, with an established chain of command and authority based on law and regulation.<sup>1</sup> It also bring with it links to regional and international military organizations involved in counterdrug operations. The military brings with it the possibility of synchronized operations involving large concentrations of troops, personnel, and equipment for limited periods.

Trinidad and Tobago must establish a single counterdrug undertaking that has cooperative planning and synchronized execution. The experience of the United States in its counternarcotic ventures must not go unnoticed. Trinidad and Tobago must abandon its present model that is based on the pre-1989 United States model and move closer to its post-1989 United States model of counterdrug operations. The success of the antidrug endeavor will depend on a cohesive, synthesize, and proportionate application by all organizations involved in counterdrug operations. There is a need for a single consolidated drug control budget that would not place additional burdens on the budgets of the organizations involved in counterdrug operations. This should go a long way in

relieving the fears of the officers concerned about the loss of warfighting skills and eliminate the rivalry between government organizations concerned about funding.

The various national strategies should have as an objective a complete mobilization of the society in the war against drugs. The nation has to be mobilized so that the fight against the drug menace can be approached as a national undertaking. The piecemeal approach will have to be discarded for a cohesive effort that would incorporate people and organizations from all segments of the society. The military's mission must be nested vertically and horizontally in the mission of the other participants in the war against the illegal drug trade.

The JOCC is of tremendous value in establishing a cohesive, synchronized, and coordinated counterdrug program. The infrastructure for the coordination and synchronization of the counternarcotic struggle at the operational level in Trinidad and Tobago is simplified through the existence of the JOCC. The JOCC must not be allowed to only provide minimum calibration and synchronization of the counterdrug effort. The military and civilian organizations must be educated as to the benefits and capabilities of the JOCC. The JOCC has the potential to develop into the nerve center of the drug control strategy in the Trinidad and Tobago model. Its links to the special adviser, to the office for counterdrug strategy, a future possibility, and the Prime Minister's Office will make it a valuable contributor to the national counternarcotic effort. It can provide all organizations involved in counterdrug operations with access to intelligence on the activities of narco-traffickers in Trinidad and Tobago. The JOCC has the potential to provide the various organizations with the facilities for coordination and synchronization of counterdrug operations. This would reduce the potential for conflict among the

different organizations and the wastage of manpower and resources in planning and coordinating counterdrug operations that other organizations are already involved in. The JOCC has the potential to reduce organizational conflict drastically.

The research question asks what should be the role of the armed forces in fighting the illegal drug trade in Trinidad and Tobago? The answer is to become the facilitator of a new counterdrug model that encourages cooperation, coordination and synchronization. This can be achieved through the establishment of a comprehensive and cohesive antidrug undertaking that is national in scope and implementation. At the strategic level, the Defence Force can provide personnel through its senior officers at the level of the National Security Council and Defence Council to advise and guide the national leaders to a singular counterdrug effort. The senior military leaders should advise and guide the national leaders in the production of written national security strategy, national drug strategy master plan, and a defence policy. The national drug strategy master plan and the defence policy must be nested in the national security strategy and they must provide a vision and guidance for the personnel to translate at the operational and tactical levels.

The role of the special adviser to the Prime Minister should be enhanced and tasked with the responsibility of coordinating and synchronizing the national counternarcotic effort. The special adviser should be given the responsibility of producing a consolidated counterdrug budget and recommending the improvements and adjustments of the organizations involved in the counterdrug effort. The antidrug funding should be separate from the national security funding so that organizations can continue with their other responsibilities such as law and order or national security.

The Trinidad and Tobago national security strategy should therefore provide the vision and guidance of the national leaders on the security strategy for the nation. This would provide the other actors with the tools necessary to prepare their own strategies at the other levels of the society. The drug control strategy should seek to mobilize the support of the entire nation in the eradication of illegal drugs from the society. The drug control strategy should seek to incorporate the activities of the various organizations involved in counterdrug operations into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort. The efforts of the various organizations should be synchronized to achieve maximum effects. This would require incorporating the drug control strategy into the national military strategy and vice versa, so that the different players are all using “the same sheet of music.”

The drug control strategy must be nested in the military strategy. This will reflect the importance of the counterdrug operations to the military hierarchy. The military strategy should also provide information on the sources of funding for counterdrug operations as well as security operations. This will provide the military officers with the information necessary to make valued judgments on the emphasis that is being placed on the success of counterdrug operations in the national scheme of things.

The military strategy should provide information on the support for Trinidad and Tobago counterdrug operations by its major ally the United States. It should also provide information on how Trinidad and Tobago intends to support its ally in its own efforts to combat the illegal drug trade in the United States and throughout the region. USSOUTHCOM states that stemming the flow of drugs into the United States from Central America is one of its objectives.<sup>2</sup> The principles that apply to the national

antidrug endeavor will also apply in many circumstances to the regional effort as well. Synchronization and coordination at the regional level would also have to be a part of the military and drug control strategies. In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that the United States has the resources to provide a wide range of support to the organizations involved in the counterdrug effort. This support would have to be factored into the operational planning for the counterdrug effort at the various levels and among the various organizations involved in the war against drugs.

Equipping and training Latin American and Caribbean militaries is an important dimension of any comprehensive institutional-building effort, but it should not be the first or only priority. As in the United States, drug enforcement is primarily a civilian rather than a military function.<sup>3</sup>

Trinidad and Tobago as an economically advanced small nation-state can influence its less fortunate neighbors to develop a regional counterdrug strategy by the success of its own antidrug operations. If this attempt is nested in the counterdrug operations of its larger neighbor and ally then the other island nations will see and appreciate the benefits of cooperation at the regional and international levels. It is much easier for different nations and organizations to cooperate and coordinate actions and operations when there is a commonality of principles, procedures, and activities present. If Trinidad and Tobago can demonstrate to the other islands its commitment to combating the illegal drug trade in a synchronized and cohesive manner in conjunction with its major ally, it will encourage them likewise to develop their counterdrug strategy as well. This would be in the best interests of the entire Caribbean region, and it would enhance the image of Trinidad and Tobago regionally.



Trinidad and Tobago must mobilize its citizenry to combat the illegal drug trade nationally. It must be a societal enterprise for it to achieve success. The drug control undertaking cannot remain as the responsibility of the law enforcement agencies or the military exclusively. The citizenry must be mobilized and the nation must be made aware of the scourge of illegal drugs on the nation. The nation must wage war against the illegal drug trade and all those that profits by it to the detriment of the citizenry at large. The national counter drug strategy would go a long way it providing guidance and direction to the citizens and organizations in the ways in which they can contribute to the overall success of the counterdrug effort. The military must work in tandem with the law enforcement agencies and they must have the support and cooperation of the citizenry in order to achieve success.

The United States counterdrug model is a comprehensive, coordinated effort at combating the illegal drug trade. The Trinidad and Tobago model will remain limited in scope and objectives, as it does not require the extensiveness of the United States model based on the limitations of the realities of Trinidad and Tobago's international position vis a vis the United States. The Trinidad and Tobago model can be improved as the United States model was improved after 1989. The Trinidad and Tobago model requires intent, focus and an end state. It requires intent so that the society can know what the national leaders want the various organizations involved in counterdrug operations to achieve. It requires focus so that the resources that are available to the players involved in counterdrug operations can be used in the positive manner to achieve success. This would allow maximum use of resources with minimum wastage in terms of manpower and resources. It requires an end state so that the various organizations can determine for

themselves where they are at present and how they are going to proceed to the final victory.

Trinidad and Tobago possesses the leadership to spearhead the local and regional effort required for a war on drugs. The activities of the national leadership over the years have demonstrated the national will to make hard decisions in the best interests of the nation in the ongoing fight against the drug trade. Some examples of this national determination and will are:

1. The signing of the Shiprider Agreement with the United States that allowed United States forces to pursue criminals across territorial borders.
2. The execution of nine convicted drug criminals in the face of local and international opposition.
3. The creation of new government agencies to improve the effectiveness of the counterdrug effort, that is, the SSA and SIA.
4. The passage of new laws to confiscate the property and assets of persons convicted of drug related crimes and to provide funding to organizations involved in the counterdrug effort.

These activities illustrate the determination to continue the war against the illegal drug trade. It demonstrates that the national leaders have the disposition to provide the leadership necessary to combat the drug menace at all levels of the society.

This study promotes the perspective that a holistic approach to the problem of combating the illegal drug trade in Trinidad and Tobago is necessary. The approach to this problem must be bi-partisan and the various organizations involved must coordinate and synchronize their efforts in order to achieve success. It recognizes that the Trinidad

and Tobago Defence Force has an important role to play in providing the leadership and expertise required in achieving a high level to coordination and synchronization. The Defence Force has the ability and the responsibility to influence the entire process at the various levels of MOOTW. This would enhance the entire process and would bring about the level of coordination and synchronization that a cohesive and comprehensive counterdrug strategy requires.

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Publications, 17 February 1998), III-40.

<sup>2</sup> Murl D. Mugner and William W. Mendel, "Campaign Planning and the Drug War," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1991), 61.

<sup>3</sup> Peter H. Smith, ed., *Drug Policy in the America*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 143.

Table 1. Trinidad and Tobago Model Matrix

Prime Minister's Office	National vision, strategic objectives	Appointment of special adviser to Prime Minister Input to Joint Operation Command Center		Contacts, links with regional and international leaders	Informational data base on national issues	Guidance and directives to military leaders	National guidance and directives on economic issues
National Security Council	policy, strategic direction				Informational data base on national security issues	directives to military and civil leaders	
Defence Council	policy formulation, council directives, delegation, administrative control				Informational data base on military issues	Operational and Administrative control of the Defense Force	Guidance on financial allocations

Ministry of National Security	administrative control	Administrative control, Ministerial input		Contacts and, International links. Monitoring of international programs, IMET, MTAP, etc	Informational data base on national security issues	directives to military leaders	National security allocations in national budget
Ministry of External Affairs	Interpretation of national interests at the international level. foreign policy strategies	Implementation of operational plans and objectives at the regional and international arena		International and national legal links, contacts, action Monitoring of regional and international agreements	Legal database of criminal and criminal activities		
Standing Committee on Crime	Recommends solutions for dealing with crime	Collect and analyze information from documents and consultation with various groups			Collect and analyze information from documents and consultation with various groups		

Attorney General Office	Legal policy and framework	Implementation of national legal objectives and plans at the national, regional and international arenas		Implementation of national legal objectives and plans at the regional and international arenas	Maintenance of information database		Action against money laundering, illegal business transactions
Defence Force Headquarters	Chief of Defense Staff represents the organization in the National Security and Defense Councils	Coordination of land and sea Operations		Links with regional and international military	Maintenance of military information database	Operational control of the Defence Force	Defence allocations in national budget
Police Service Headquarters	Police Commissioner represents the organization in the National Security Councils	Coordination of law enforcement Operations		Links with international agencies i.e. INTERPOL, DEA,	Maintenance of civil information database	Police Operations	Police Service budget

Police Service Divisions		Coordination of law enforcement operational plans and objectives	Arrests, and detention of persons involved in illegal activities and seizure of assets and property of convicted drug personnel		Maintenance of civil information database	Para-military operations to arrest and detain criminal elements	Arrests, detention and seizure of assets and property of convicted drug personnel
Customs and Excise		Coordination of law enforcement operational plans and objectives	Arrests, detention and seizure of assets and property of convicted drug personnel		Maintenance of civil information database	Para-military operations to seize cargoes and arrest criminal elements	Seizure of drugs and illegal substances

Special Service Agency		Collect and analyze information from various sources and provide intelligence to Counterdrug organizations		Links to regional and international agencies	Collect and analyze information from various sources	Provision of intelligence to counterdrug organizations	
Special Branch		Collect and analyze information from various sources and provide intelligence to counter drug organizations	Arrests, detention and seizure of assets and property of convicted drug personnel	Links with regional and international agencies	Collect and analyze information from various sources	Provision of intelligence to counterdrug organizations	Seizure of assets and property of convicted drug personnel
Joint Operations Control Center		coordination execution of land based operations			Maintenance of operational information database	Coordination, synchronization of counterdrug operations	
Regimental Headquarters		Implementation, coordination execution of land based operations			Maintenance of an operational and tactical intelligence database	Land tactical execution, monitoring, interdiction missions	



<b>Coast Guard Headquarters</b>		<b>Implementation, coordination of execution of maritime operations</b>	<b>execution, monitoring, interdiction and search and rescue missions Arrests, and detention of persons involved in illegal maritime activities</b>		<b>Maintenance of tactical intelligence database</b>	<b>Maritime tactical execution, monitoring, interdiction</b>	
<b>Battalion Headquarters</b>		<b>coordination of execution of land based operations</b>	<b>execution, monitoring, interdiction missions</b>		<b>Maintenance of tactical intelligence database</b>	<b>interdiction missions</b>	

Table 2. United States Model Matrix

	Strategic	Operational	Tactical	Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic
Executive Office of the President	National Security Strategy			National direction, guidance and initiatives	National direction, guidance and initiatives	Commander in Chief	Economic policy
National Security Council	National Security Strategy				National Security Strategy	Guidance on National Security	Economic security
Office of the National drug Control Policy	National Drug Control Strategy	Budget, coordination, overseeing, submission of studies and reports	Programs, policies at national, regional and international forums	Interaction with host nations involved in CD operations	Consolidated budget, coordination, Representation in Congress.	Guidance to military of drug control policy	Assistance to Host Nations
Department of Defence		Enforcement of drug-related civil and criminal law	Prevention and detection of drug-related crime	CINC interaction with geographical nations	Liaison with ONDCP		
Joint Chiefs of Staff	National Military Strategy			Links with international military leaders	Joint Publications	National Military Strategy	
CINCs/CD	Theatre vision,	Theatre plans,	Theatre missions,	Interaction with Host	Geographical databases and	Command and Control of	Assistance to Host

Commander	strategy, and campaigns	objectives	operations, logistics	Nations involved in CD operations	expertise	United States Forces	Nations involved in CD operations
Department of Justice	Supervision of agencies and bureaus	Enforcement of drug-related civil and criminal laws and regulations			Intelligence on drug-related civil and criminal laws and regulations	Enforcement of drug-related civil and criminal laws and regulations	
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Long term investigation of drug trafficking organizations	Dismantling drug trafficking networks	Arresting core drug-trafficking leadership	International links	Long term investigation of drug trafficking organizations	Dismantling networks, arresting core drug-trafficking leadership	To seize and forfeit assets from illicit drug trafficking
Drug Enforcement Administration	Lead Agency for developing the overall Federal drug enforcement strategy, programs, planning and evaluation.	Enforcement of controlled substances laws and regulations of the US	Investigate and prepare for prosecution of major violators; To seize assets from illicit drug trafficking	International links	Lead Agency for developing the overall Federal drug enforcement strategy, programs, planning and evaluation	Enforcement of controlled substances laws and regulations of the US	To seize and forfeit assets from illicit drug trafficking

INTERPOL		Provides information of drug-related personnel at national, regional, and international arenas	Provides information on foreign drug and contraband trends and information on US citizens arrested abroad.	International links	Provides information of drug-related personnel at national, regional, and international arenas		Assistance to host nations involved in CD operations
Department of State	Planning US foreign policy	Implementing foreign policy and providing Host Nation information. Guidance for US Ambassadors through regional bureaus		Implementation and interpretation of US national drug policy and strategy overseas	Guidance for US Ambassadors through regional bureaus	Liaison with CINCs	assistance to HN in support of CD operations
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs		Coordinating international supply reduction and demand reduction strategies and programs	Crop eradication, income replacement, investigations, support for	Implementation of US national drug policy and strategy overseas	Guidance for US Ambassadors through regional bureaus	Liaison with CINCs	assistance to HN in support of CD operations



			attempting to "launder" illegal revenues						
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms		Districts LEA in principal cities and regions	Investigate and suppress illegal trafficking						
Department of Transportation						Federal Agency with jurisdiction on the high seas	Informational database	Maritime execution, monitoring, interdiction	
US Coast Guard			Maritime execution, monitoring, interdiction						



Figure 2. Map of Trinidad and Tobago  
 Available from <http://www.lib.utexas.edu.Libs/PCL/Map> collection/  
 Americas/Trinidad and Tobago.GIF. Internet. Accessed on 20 March 2000



Figure 3. Map of the Caribbean Sea  
 Available from [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map collection/Americas/Trinidad and Tobago.GIF](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/Americas/Trinidad and Tobago.GIF). Internet. Accessed on 20 March 2000



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